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1. Of the 140 published state and federal decisions to use the term “double effect” prior to
the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), by far the most common
usages of the term have been for purposes irrelevant to the ethical concept of “double effect.”
Instead of a philosophical meaning, these cases refer simply to an action or event that has two
distinct effects. See, e.g., Gray v. Texas Co., 75 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1935) (“When the stem is
made the key, the joint duty of holding the chain and winding the watch is performed by the same
instrument. A double effect is produced or a double duty performed by the combined result.”).
Only seven cases before Quill explicitly refer to “double effect” in a philosophical sense, and
in none of these cases is the principle relied upon by the court to justify its holding. Venture
Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 96 F.3d 275, 280 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting as an aside for
the benefit of “theology buffs” that a seller’s decision to raise the purchase price of a business
during negotiations, foreseeing that the purchaser would opt out of the deal, was not bad faith and
comparing the situation to the “the Catholic doctrine of double effect”); Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 823-24, 828 (9th Cir. 1996) (rejecting, in the context of a due process
claim, any relevant distinction between prescribing medicine with the “single effect” of killing the
patient and administering medicine with the “double effect” of relieving pain yet hastening death),
rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Chase v. United States, 468 F.2d
141, 142, 148 & n.21, 149 (7th Cir. 1972) (affirming convictions despite the defendant’s attempt
to justify the burning of draft documents by invoking the doctrine of “double effect”); DeGrella ex
rel. Parrent v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 715 (Ky. 1993) (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (referring,
sua sponte, to the principle of “double effect” without further discussion); Brophy v. New Eng.
Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Mass. 1986) (Nolan, J., dissenting) (raising, sua sponte,
the applicability of “double effect” but rejecting its relevance where the death of a patient was
caused directly by the withdrawal of food and water and not by an underlying disease); Hobbins
v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 494, 495 n.1, 497-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (Shelton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (dissenting from the majority’s denial of a due process
right to physician-assisted suicide, noting without further discussion or reliance that palliative care
and medication causes the “double effect” of relieving pain and hastening death but ultimately
rejecting a distinction between “intended” versus “foreseen” consequences of action), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 658, 664, 671-72 (N.J. 1976) (holding that a comatose patient’s life support may be
withdrawn because of her right to privacy and noting without approval or discussion that the
patient’s Catholic father considered it licit to withdraw life support based on the “principle of
double effect”).
2. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
3. Id. at 807-08 & n.11.
4. See Philip E. Devine, Principle of Double Effect, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF
PHILOSOPHY 644-45 (Robert Audi ed., 1995).
I.  INTRODUCTION
Relying explicitly on the “principle of double effect” for the first time
in American law,1 the Supreme Court in Vacco v. Quill2—a decision
noteworthy if for no other reason than for that very reliance—rejected an
equal protection claim asserting a right to physician-assisted suicide.3
Double effect, traced historically to Thomas Aquinas, proposes that under
certain circumstances, it is permissible unintentionally to cause foreseen
“evil” effects that would not be permissible to cause intentionally.4
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5. Quill, 521 U.S. at 801-02.
6. Id. at 797-99, 801.
7. BEN A. RICH, STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: HOW MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE HAS INFLUENCED
MEDICAL ETHICS AND MEDICAL PRACTICE 142 (2001).
8. Id. at 143.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 286 (1958).
12. RICH, supra note 7, at 142.
Applying this principle, the Court distinguished intending the death of a
terminally ill patient from merely foreseeing death as a consequence of
medical treatment.5 Based on this distinction and noting that it “comports
with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent,” the Court
rejected the plaintiffs’ claims.6
Criticism of Quill, however, was in some circles severe and no doubt
fueled by the fact that, as one commentator observed, the Court offered
“precious little argumentation or analysis” for reliance on double effect.7
Critics of the decision focus mainly on two points of contention. First, the
Court’s reliance on double effect is allegedly misguided because the
principle itself contradicts basic conceptions about intention and
culpability.8 One commentator, noting that the law presumes that agents
intend the natural and probable consequences of their actions,9 asserts, “it
is nothing more than self-deception to maintain that the physician who
provides terminal sedation foresees, but does not intend, the patient’s
death.”10
Such criticism of double effect is not novel. Decades earlier, Glanville
Williams had rejected a similar attempt to distinguish physician-assisted
suicide from other medical treatments of the terminally ill:
What is true of morals is true of the law. There is no legal
difference between desiring or intending a consequence as
following from your conduct, and persisting in your conduct
with a knowledge that the consequence will inevitably follow
from it, though not desiring that consequence. When a result
is foreseen as certain, it is the same as if it were desired or
intended.11
The second criticism leveled against the Quill decision is that the
application of double effect analysis simply has no support in case law.
The doctrine of double effect is alleged to be “an obscure, ambiguous, and
controversial artifact of medieval Catholic theology. It has no previously
recognized status in the law, and it has been either ignored or severely
criticized in the philosophical literature.”12 Similarly, although perhaps
less forcefully, another scholar observes: “[The doctrine of double effect]
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13. JERRY MENIKOFF, LAW AND BIOETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION 343 (2001).
14. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801 (1997).
15. The plaintiff-patients, Jane Doe (anonymous), George A. Kingsley, and William A.
Barth, were all terminally ill patients who died before the district court rendered its final judgment.
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 718, 722 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). Plaintiff-
physicians Timothy E. Quill, Samuel C. Klagsbrun, and Howard A. Grossman were physicians at
the time. Id. at 718.
The plaintiffs’ claims challenged New York law not only with respect to the rights of the
patients to commit suicide with physician assistance but also with respect to the physicians’
asserted claim that “proper and humane medical practice should include the ability to prescribe
medication which will enable a patient to commit suicide.” Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (1996), rev’d 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
The issue of justiciability raised by New York’s assertion of only a “speculative possibility of
prosecution” was rejected by the district court. Id. at 81 (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
a companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which held that the constitutional claim
has had little direct effect on legal analysis . . . . It is a highly technical
doctrine, and it is far from clear how useful it is in distinguishing between
permissible and impermissible actions.”13
The contrast between the Court’s confidence that its holding embodies
“fundamental legal principles of causation and intent”14 and critics’
skepticism raises obvious concerns about the ruling’s
coherence—concerns that the opinion’s cursory defense of its reliance on
double effect fails to negate.
This Article responds to these concerns by supplying what the Quill
opinion arguably lacks with respect to both criticisms. Part II directly
defends double effect as a valid principle of ethical deliberation against
contemporary philosophical objections to it. Part III illustrates that, claims
to the contrary notwithstanding, double effect analysis is a pervasive,
albeit generally unacknowledged, principle employed regularly in
American case law. Part IV, drawing on the preceding considerations,
argues that Quill’s application of the principle of double effect, though
lacking a fully articulated foundation, comports with canons of ethical and
jurisprudential reasoning.
The principle of double effect in fact constitutes an unremarkable,
well-trod mode of analysis applied in numerous contexts. Double effect
provides an indispensable model for resolving culpability questions for
many situations in which actors are called upon to contemplate conduct
intentionally aimed at protecting some important good, although
foreseeing at the same time that such conduct will cause unintended harm.
II.  DOUBLE EFFECT AND ITS CRITICS
A.  Quill and Its Reliance on the “Principle of Double Effect”
In Quill, three terminally ill patients and three physicians15 brought an
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of physicians in fear of prosecution under abortion laws was justiciable).
In further support of its finding of justiciability, the district court noted that Quill already had
been subject to a criminal investigation in New York following an earlier incident relating to the
prescription of barbituates for a terminally ill patient who eventually used the drug to commit
suicide. Id. at 80, 82. The investigation arose following Quill’s publication of an essay in The New
England Journal of Medicine describing his experience with this patient. Id. at 80; see Timothy E.
Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691
(1991).
16. Section 125.15, NEW YORK PENAL LAWS (Consol. 2004), provides in relevant part: “A
person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when . . . [h]e intentionally causes or aids
another person to commit suicide. Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.”
Section 120.30 provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt
when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide. Promoting a suicide attempt
is a class E felony.” See also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 774 n.13, 775 n.14 (1997);
Quill, 521 U.S. at 797 n.1 (1997).
17. Quill, 521 U.S. at 798.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For discussion of the district court’s rejection of the
plaintiffs’ equal protection claim and the appellate court’s acceptance of the claim, see infra notes
305-15 and accompanying text.
19. Quill, 521 U.S. at 798-802 & n.6.
20. “Life-sustaining treatment is any treatment that serves to prolong life without reversing
the underlying medical condition. Life-sustaining treatment may include, but is not limited to,
mechanical ventilation, renal dialysis, chemotherapy, antibiotics, and artificial nutrition and
hydration.” CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS § E-2.20 (Am. Med. Ass’n 2004); see also infra note 370.
By “withholding of life-support,” this Article refers without distinction to both the refusal to initiate
life support and the discontinuance of life support already begun in respect to terminally-ill patients.
21. Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 92 (1994). The report states:
The intent of the palliative treatment is to relieve pain and suffering, not to end the
patient’s life, but the patient’s death is a possible side effect of the treatment. It is
ethically acceptable for a physician to gradually increase the appropriate
medication for a patient, realizing that the medication may depress respiration and
cause death.
Id. (emphasis added).
action against the State of New York claiming that the prohibition of
physician-assisted suicide under the state’s general prohibition against
assisted suicide16 violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution,17 which provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”18 The plaintiffs
alleged that New York allowed other competent, terminally ill persons,
with the assistance of physicians, to elect medical treatment that had the
foreseen effect of causing death,19 namely, withholding of life support20
and pharmacologic palliative care.21 Yet, plaintiffs further alleged,
similarly situated persons—like the patient-plaintiffs themselves—were
denied the right under New York law to physician-assisted suicide because
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22. See Quill, 521 U.S. at 796-98.
23. Id. at 798. An argument based on the ability of patients to refuse unwanted life-sustaining
treatment was asserted by plaintiffs in their complaint and discussed at length by both the district
court and the court of appeals. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 721-22, 728-31 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d,
521 U.S. 793 (1997); Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom.
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). The argument relying on
palliative care, however, was discussed nowhere by the district court, see Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 79-
85, mentioned sua sponte merely in passing by the court of appeals, Quill, 80 F.3d at 729, and
addressed on the merits only by the Supreme Court, Quill, 521 U.S. at 802. It appears to have been
raised seriously by the parties for the first time only before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Oral
Argument of Dennis C. Vacco on Behalf of the Petitioners at 2-5, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997) (No. 95-1858), reprinted in 255 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 839, 840-43 (Gerald Gunther & Gerhard
Casper eds., 1998).
24. Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
majority opinion. Quill, 521 U.S. at 794. Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion, and Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer filed concurrences in the judgment. Id.
25. Id. at 801-03 (citations omitted) (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
such treatment had the effect of causing the patient’s death.22 Asserting
that physician-assisted suicide was “essentially the same thing” as those
permitted medical treatments, plaintiffs claimed that the differing
treatment under state law was irrational and violated their federal
constitutional right to equal protection.23
Rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims, the Supreme Court held in a majority
opinion24 that New York’s distinction between physician-assisted suicide
and the accepted medical practices involved application of a familiar
distinction recognized in the law:
The distinction comports with fundamental legal
principles of causation and intent. . . .
. . . .
The law has long used actors’ intent or purpose to
distinguish between two acts that may have the same
result. . . . Put differently, the law distinguishes actions taken
“because of” a given end from actions taken “in spite of”
their unintended but foreseen consequences.25
The Court observed that actions taken in carrying out physician-
assisted suicide are chosen precisely because of an intent to bring about
the death of the patient: “A doctor who assists a suicide . . . ‘must,
necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the patient be made
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26. Id. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United States, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 367 (1996) [hereinafter
Assisted Suicide Hearing] (prepared statement of Dr. Leon R. Kass, M.D., Addie Clark Harding
Professor, The College and Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago)).
27. Id. (quoting with approval In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985)).
28. Id. at 807 n.11 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 800-01. To defeat an equal protection claim such as that in Quill, it must be
determined that a rational basis justifies the differing legal treatment. Id. at 799 n.5; Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716, 725-27 (2d Cir. 1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
The plaintiffs also claimed that the New York statutes deprived the plaintiffs and physicians
of a fundamental liberty right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Quill
v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716
(1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). Both the district court and the court of appeals rejected the due
process claim. Quill, 80 F.3d at 723-25; Quill, 870 F. Supp. at 82-84. Presumably, the plaintiffs in
Quill failed to file a protective petition for certiorari under SUP. CT. R. 12(5) on this rejected claim
because certiorari had been granted on essentially the same due process argument for physician-
assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg, 518 U.S. 1057 (1996). See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at i, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110) (petitioning for
certiorari based on the due process claim). In rejecting the due process claim, the Glucksberg Court
reiterated the distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the other actions: “The decision
to commit suicide with the assistance of another may be just as personal and profound as the
decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but it has never enjoyed similar legal protection.
Indeed, the two acts are widely and reasonably regarded as quite distinct.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 725.
30. See, e.g., Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, The Supreme Court Addresses Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Can Its Rulings Improve Palliative Care?, 8 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 200, 201 (1999)
(stating that the Quill majority opinion “concludes that the double-effect doctrine provides a
rational and constitutional basis for states to allow narcotics given in high dosages for pain relief
in terminally ill patients, while prohibiting assisted suicide,” and that the Supreme Court’s
“acceptance of the double-effect doctrine may help relieve physicians’ concerns about legal liability
for providing adequate pain relief that may hasten death”); Juan Carlos Batlle, Legal Status of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2279, 2279 (2003) (“Physicians are generally
dead.’”26 Acts involved in the other treatments, however, entail no similar
intent but may be carried out for other purposes in spite of the fact that
they are foreseen to cause the patient’s death: “[P]atients who refuse life-
sustaining treatment ‘may not harbor a specific intent to die’ and may
instead ‘fervently wish to live, but to do so free of unwanted medical
technology, surgery, or drugs’”27 and “[j]ust as a State may . . . permit[]
patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative
care related to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but unintended
‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s death.”28 In light of this
distinction between the actors’ intentions, the Supreme Court found that
New York had a rational basis for distinguishing physician-assisted
suicide from the accepted medical treatments and, therefore, upheld the
state’s prohibition against physician-assisted suicide.29
As these statements expressly indicate, and as commentators have
confirmed,30 Quill’s rejection of a constitutional right to physician-assisted
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protected . . . under the established principle of ‘double effect,’ wherein one act produces two
inseparable effects: one good (relieving pain) and one bad (opiate sedation to the point of death).”);
Arthur R. Derse, Is There a Lingua Franca for Bioethics at the End of Life?, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
279, 282 (2000) (“The principle of double effect was even commented on favorably by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its analysis of the legal consequences of possible lethal effects of providing
adequate pain relief during end-of-life care.”); Kevin P. Glynn, ‘Double Effect’: Getting the
Argument Right, COMMONWEAL, Jan. 29, 1999, at 10, 10 (“In its [Quill and Glucksberg] decisions
denying . . . a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide . . . the . . . Supreme Court
recognized the moral distinction between actively helping patients to kill themselves . . .  and . . .
withholding treatment from . . . terminally ill patients, thereby permitting death. In so doing, the
Court gave legal standing to the ethical principle of double effect.”); Yale Kamisar et al., Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia: An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 6, 1997, at 68, 68 (“[N]ot only is
Breyer (and O’Connor as well) supporting the ‘double effect’ principle [in Quill] . . . he is signaling
that the principle may be constitutionally required.”); John M. Luce & Ann Alpers, Legal Aspects
of Withholding and Withdrawing Life Support from Critically Ill Patients in the United States and
Providing Palliative Care to Them, 162 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 2029, 2030
(2000) (“The Supreme Court distinguished assisted suicide from palliative care in Glucksberg and
Quill by accepting the principle of double effect.”); Timothy E. Quill et al., The Rule of Double
Effect—A Critique of Its Role in End-of-Life Decision Making, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1768, 1769
(1997) (“The recent Supreme Court rulings on physician-assisted suicide illustrate . . . how current
law and the rule of double effect evaluate the clinician’s conduct in various end-of-life practices.”).
Relying on the distinction between palliative care and physician-assisted suicide made in Quill
and confirmed in Glucksberg, see supra note 29, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an
interpretive rule declaring that use of controlled drugs to effect physician-assisted suicide violates
the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (1970): “Pain management, rather than
assisted suicide, has long been recognized as a legitimate medical purpose justifying physicians’
dispensing of controlled substances. There are important medical, ethical, and legal distinctions
between intentionally causing a patient’s death and providing sufficient dosages of pain medication
necessary to eliminate or alleviate pain.” 66 Fed. Reg. 56.607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001). The
“Ashcroft Directive” criminalizes conduct specifically authorized by the Oregon Death with
Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 127.800-.897 (2003). See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1120
(9th Cir. 2004).  The Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the government’s petition from
adverse rulings on this issue in the lower federal courts.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 125 S. Ct. 1299
(2005).
31. A variety of ways of referring to the principle of double effect have been employed,
including “double effect reasoning” or the “principle,” “rule,” or “doctrine” of double effect. See,
e.g., Thomas A. Cavanaugh, Aquinas’s Account of Double Effect, 61 THOMIST 107, 107 (1997).
suicide entails explicit application of the principle of “double effect.”31
One philosopher, for example, in language strikingly similar to that
employed by the Court itself, describes the operative distinction at play in
double effect as follows:
[T]he foreseen consequences of one’s bringing about an
intended state of affairs are often considered in deliberating,
but not as reasons for the action—rather, they are sometimes
conditions in spite of which one acts. It is not for the sake of
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32. Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, in THE
DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE 7,
15 (P. A. Woodward ed., 2001); see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. “[B]efore the time of St. Thomas Aquinas there is no indication of a definitely formulated
principle of the double effect.” Joseph T. Mangan, An Historical Analysis of the Principle of
Double Effect, 10 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 41, 42 (1949); see also Cavanaugh, supra note 31, at 107.
Mangan suggests, however, that earlier texts, including biblical texts, clearly support the
principle. See Mangan, supra, at 41-42. Mangan suggests that implicit reference to its operation is
illustrated in 1 Maccabees 6:43-46 [New Oxford Annotated]:
And Eleazer, called Avaran, saw that one of the beasts was equipped with royal
armor. It was taller than all the others, and he supposed that the king was upon it.
So he gave his life to save his people and to win for himself an everlasting name.
He courageously ran into the midst of the phalanx to reach it; he killed men right
and left, and they parted before him on both sides. He got under the elephant,
stabbed it from beneath, and killed it; but it fell to the ground upon him and there
he died.
See Mangan, supra, at 42.
34. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, II-II, 64, 7 (3d ed. Biblioteca de Autores
such conditions that one selects an option; it is not these
effects to which one is committed in acting.32
B.  Origin of the Principle
Little debate exists that the principle of double effect in current form
originates from the writings of Thomas Aquinas.33 The locus classicus is
found in a discussion of self-defense where Aquinas argues that acts
resulting in the death of an assailant are permissible based primarily on a
distinction that can be drawn between the effect that an agent intends to
bring about by his conduct—the preservation of the actor’s life—and the
effect of action that is not part of that intention—the death of the assailant:
[N]othing prevents there from being two effects of one act, of
which only one is in intention [in intentione] and the other
outside intention [praeter intentionem]. Moral acts, however,
receive their character from what is intended and not from
what is outside of intention. . . . From the act of defending
oneself, therefore, two effects may follow: one being
preservation of one’s life and the other the killing of an
attacker. Now an act of this type, insofar as the preservation
of one’s own life is intended, is not illicit since it is natural
for every being to keep itself alive to the extent possible. . . .
It is not necessary . . . that a man refrain from carrying out a
measured act of defense to avoid the killing of another. A
person has a greater obligation to provide for his own life
than for that of another.34
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Cristianos 1963) (Author’s translation):
dicendum quod nihil prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum
sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt
speciem secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter
intentionem . . . . Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis duplex effectus sequi
potest: unus quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio invadentis.
Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae, non
habet rationem illiciti: cum hoc sit cuilibet naturale quod se conservet in esse
quantum potest. . . . Nec est necessarium . . . ut homo actum moderatae tutelae
praetermittat ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur homo vitae suae
providere quam vitae alienae.
Id. Elsewhere Aquinas observed: “It is possible that a single action according to its natural species
may be related to different ends of the will . . . . Thus nothing prohibits acts that are identical
according to the species of nature from being morally distinct . . . .” Id. at I-II, 1, 3, ad. 3 (Author’s
translation) (“Possibile tamen est quod unus actus secundum speciem naturae ordinetur ad diversos
fines voluntatis . . . . Et ideo nihil prohibet actus qui sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse
diversos secundum speciem moris . . . .”).
35. Id. at II-II, 64, 7.
But because it is not permissible to kill a man except by authority of the
community for the common good, . . . it is illicit for a man to intend to kill another
in order to defend himself, unless he has public authority, and, in intending to kill
a man in self-defense, refers it to the good of the community: as is seen in a
soldier fighting against enemies and a judicial officer combating thieves. Although
these too would do wrong if they were motivated by merely personal desire.
Id. (Author’s translation) (“Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi publica auctoritate propter
bonum commune, . . . illicitum est quod homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum defendat, nisi
ei qui habet publicam auctoritatem, qui intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem refert hoc
ad publicum bonum, ut patet in milite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante
contra latrones quamvis et isti peccent si privata libidine moveantur.”).
36. Id. (Author’s translation) (“Potest tamen aliquis actus ex bona intentione proveniens
illicitus reddi si non sit proportionatus fini. Et ideo si aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam
While exhaustive consideration of Aquinas’s view on self-defense is
beyond the scope of this discussion, several observations are in order.
First, to correctly interpret this passage, it is necessary to bear in mind that
Aquinas believes that it is never permissible for a private citizen to intend
the death of another person, even in cases of self-defense.35 Second, in
taking any action aimed at self-defense, the conduct must be reasonable in
light of the threat presented:
Even an act with a good intention, however, can be rendered
illicit if not proportioned to the end sought. Hence, if a man
in defending his life uses greater force than is necessary it
would be illicit; but if he repels the attack by a measured use
of force, it would be a licit defense . . . .36
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utatur maiori violentia quam oporteat, erit illicitum. Si vero moderate violentiam repellat, erit licita
defensio . . . .”).
37. “It is not necessary . . . that a man refrain from carrying out a measured act of defense
to avoid the killing of another. A person has a greater obligation to provide for his own life than
for that of another.” Id. (Author’s translation). See supra note 34 for original Latin language. If the
killing of the attacker was not a foreseeable consequence of the actor’s conduct, Aquinas’s point
here would be nonsensical. If harm were not reasonably foreseeable, no ethical issue exists for
discussion.
38. Aquinas’s parallel here is obvious: “[N]othing prevents there from being two effects of
one act, of which only one is in intention [in intentione] and the other outside intention [praeter
intentionem]. . . . From the act of defending oneself, therefore, two effects may follow: one being
preservation of one’s life and the other the killing of an attacker.” Id. (Author’s translation); see
supra note 34 for original Latin.
39. Id. at II-II, 43, 3.
Active scandal, however, may be understood in two ways: in itself [per se] and
accidentally [per accidens]. Accidentally, when it is outside the intention [praeter
intentionem] of the agent: as for instance when someone, by disordered deed or
word does not intend to provide another an occasion of ruin but only to satisfy his
own desire. . . . Active scandal in itself [per se] occurs when a person intends by
word or deed to draw another into wrongdoing.
Id. (Author’s translation) (“Scandalum autem activum potest accipi dupliciter; per se scilicet, et
per accidens. Per accidens quidem, quando est praeter intentionem agentis: ut puta cum aliquis
suo facto vel verbo inordinato non intendit alteri dare occasionem ruinae sed solum suae
satisfacere voluntati. . . . Per se autem est activum scandalum quando aliquis suo inordinato dicto
vel facto intendit alium trahere ad peccatum.”).
40. Id.
In these texts, Aquinas recognizes that sometimes the death of an
assailant is foreseeable as a consequence of legitimate defensive conduct
when appropriately responding to a lethal threat.37 The harmonization of
these views is found in Aquinas’s position that the “death of the attacker”
need play no part in the agent’s intention to act in self-defense.38 The
victim does not ipso facto “intend” to kill just because he can keep himself
alive only by engaging in conduct that is so forceful that it also has the
effect of causing the attacker’s death. In such an instance, the actor’s
conduct is permissible precisely because the death resulting from repelling
the attacker is unintentional, and the risk to one’s life is significant enough
to justify conduct that has that foreseeable result.
Proposing that human acts are morally characterized by what an actor
intends (in intentione) and not by what is outside intention (praeter
intentionem), Aquinas explains that an effect is “outside” if it is only
accidentally (per accidens) related to the effect sought by the actor.39
Aquinas elaborates this distinction more fully in discussion of “scandal,”
i.e., acts that lead others into wrongdoing.40 In that discussion, Aquinas
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41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
46. Id. at II-II, 43, 7.
In must be determined what must be omitted to avoid leading another into
wrongdoing. In this connection spiritual goods must be distinguished, Some of
these goods are necessary for health and cannot be foregone without doing serious
wrong. It is obvious, however, that one person should not do serious wrong to
prevent another from doing wrong—for a person is more obliged to care for his
or her own spiritual health than that of another. Accordingly, those good acts
which are necessary should not be omitted even to avoid causing scandal.
Id. (Author’s translation) (“Considerandum est igitur quid sit dimittendum ne alius scandalizetur.
Est autem in spiritualibus bonis distinguendum. Nam quaedam horum sunt de necessitate salutis,
quae praetermitti non possunt sine peccato mortali. Manifestum est autem quod nullus debet
mortaliter peccare ut alterius peccatum impediat: quia . . . plus debet homo suam salutem
spiritualem diligere quam alterius. Et ideo ea quae sunt de necessitate salutis praetermitti non
debent propter scandalum vitandum.”).
47. Id.
notes two different ways of causing scandal: directly (per se) or
accidentally (per accidens).41
In scandal per se, the actor has the specific goal to induce another, by
words or deeds, to do wrong.42 In scandal per accidens, however, the actor
“does not seek to provide an occasion of ruin” to the other, but rather seeks
“only the satisfaction of [the actor’s own] desire”—even though such
actions and words have the effect of causing another to do wrong.43
Aquinas observes that in scandal per accidens, the “causing” of another’s
wrongdoing is outside the intention of the agent (“incidental,” one might
say in modern usage) because the actor does not engage in the words and
actions in order to induce the other into wrongdoing.44
Developing the analysis further, Aquinas explains that the question of
whether scandal caused per accidens is always immoral, even when the
harmful effect is foreseeable, requires consideration of additional
circumstances of the conduct—like the condition in self-defense that acts
be moderated to the magnitude of the threat.45 When acts “incidentally”
causing scandal are acts that are not wrong in themselves, and such acts
correspond to a duty, Aquinas concludes that the actor often may
permissibly engage in the conduct, even if it foreseeably causes scandal to
another.46 When, however, no duty to act exists, and the scandal is
foreseen to arise out of another party’s vulnerability as opposed to any
entrenched malicious inclination to do wrong, one may be ethically
required to forego action.47
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With respect to goods which are not necessary for spiritual health, a distinction
must be made. Scandal can sometimes arise from such conduct by virtue of
others’ malice . . . . Sometimes, however, scandal can arise from others’
weakness, or ignorance . . . . In these latter cases, such acts are either to be hidden
or postponed . . . that this type of scandal may cease.
Id. (Author’s translation) (“In his autem spiritualibus bonis quae non sunt de necessitate salutis
videtur distinguendum. Quia scandalum quod ex eis oritur quandoque ex malitia
procedit . . . . Quandoque vero scandalum procedit ex infirmitate vel ignorantia . . . . Propter quod
sunt spiritualia opera vel occultanda, vel etiam interdum differenda . . . huiusmodi scandalum
cesset.”).
48. As Mangan stated:
All moralists agree substantially on the statement of the principle, although some
word it a little differently from others. Some authors express four conditions,
others taking one or another condition for granted express only three or two
conditions. . . . [I]n its full modern dress, it may be expressed as follows: A person
In short, while Aquinas holds that it is always impermissible to engage
in conduct for the purpose of leading another into immorality, under
certain circumstances, it is permissible to unintentionally cause foreseen
scandal. Factors affecting whether one may carry out an action foreseen
but not intended to cause others to do wrong requires consideration of the
importance of the duties or reasons for performing the action and the
seriousness and character of the evil effect that will result.
C.  Elements of the Principle
Drawing upon this historical consideration, modern formulations of
double effect generally reference explicitly or implicitly the following
elements:
1. The act of the agent causing the good effect must be at
least ethically neutral, if not praiseworthy, considered in itself
(i.e., prior to assessment under double effect).
2. The good effect must follow causally from the act in such
a way that the intended good effect cannot be regarded as
“caused by” the evil effect.
3. The reason(s) for performing the act—the intended good
effect—must be of sufficient importance to justify causing
the evil effect.
4. The evil effect caused by the act must not in fact be willed
as a means or as an end by the agent.48
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may licitly perform an action that he foresees will produce a good and a bad effect
provided that four conditions are verified at one and the same time: 1) that the
action in itself from its very object be good or at least indifferent; 2) that the good
effect and not the evil effect be intended; 3) that the good effect be not produced
by means of the evil effect; 4) that there be a proportionately grave reason for
permitting the evil effect.
Mangan, supra note 33, at 42-43; see also DAVID S. ODERBERG, MORAL THEORY: A NON-
CONSEQUENTIALIST APPROACH § 3.1.2, at 90-91 (2000) (describing double effect and its four basic
conditions).
49. Christopher Kaczor, Distinguishing Intention from Foresight, 41 INT’L PHIL. Q. 77, 78-79
(2001).
Double effect proposes that under certain conditions, it is licit to
perform an otherwise ethically unobjectionable act for the sake of some
good end even if that act is foreseen to cause an evil consequence. The
important limitations are that the evil effect cannot cause the good effect,
good reason must exist for causing the good effect at the cost of the evil
effect, and one cannot bring about the evil effect other than as a mere side
effect of one’s intended end.
The terror bomber/strategic bomber scenario—perhaps the most well-
known example of double effect analysis—illustrates these elements:
Munitions factories are often located in or near civilian
populations. An act of bombing a munitions factory, then,
often has two effects, the destruction of the munitions factory
and the destruction of innocent human life. In the case of the
strategic bomber (SB), the bomber undertakes the destruction
of a munitions factory even though it is clear that innocent
civilians will be killed in the process. In the case of terror
bombing (TB), the bomber seeks to kill civilians so as to
bring war to an early end. Both SB and TB know that they
will kill civilians, and both undertake this mission in order to
bring war to a speedy end. However, SB is said solely to
foresee the deaths of the civilians, while TB intends the
deaths of the civilians.49
As this example clarifies, from an exterior “physical” perspective the
actions of the strategic and terror bombers are essentially
indistinguishable. Any differing ethical nature of their respective conduct,
therefore, can be ascertained only by considering the differing character
of each actor’s cognitive or psychological state relative to those effects.
Similar to the impossibility of distinguishing a case of self-defense from
murder solely by analysis of a physical description of the killing act itself,
in the case of the bombing it is not possible to distinguish between the two
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50. As Anscombe pointed out: “The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get . . . .” G. E. M.
ANSCOMBE, INTENTION § 36, at 68 (2d. ed. 1963).
51. BLAISE PASCAL, THE PROVINCIAL LETTERS 68 (Thomas M’Crie trans., Wipf & Stock
Publishers 1997) (1657).
52. Id. at 68.
agents unless one considers how each agent is cognitively and volitionally
disposed toward the practical possibility of “killing civilians” and the
significance of this distinction.
Double effect proposes that, based on distinctions between the actors’
intentions, the strategic bomber’s conduct is ethically permissible while
the terror bomber’s is not. Although various means by which the end of
military victory could be accomplished might have been available to the
actors, the terror bomber chooses the killing of civilians as a means to that
end. Thus, for this actor, killing civilians constitutes a specific goal of
practical reason that is caused as an integral—not incidental—part of the
agent’s volitional plan to attain his end. The terror bomber tries to kill
civilians in order to achieve victory and thus in a real, positive sense wants
that effect to come about.50 For the strategic bomber, however, awareness
that his chosen means of attaining victory, destroying a military target,
also has the foreseen effect of killing noncombatants does not play any
similar active function in practical deliberation. The deaths of civilians are
perceived as a tragic but unavoidable side effect of the means chosen to
achieve victory.
D.  Critique of the Principle—A Vacuous Concept?
Criticism of double effect, however, is neither rare nor new. As far
back as the seventeenth century, Pascal satirized proponents of double
effect for insinuating that by mere “direction of the intention,” an actor
could avoid culpability for conduct that would otherwise be immoral.51
Reacting against “Jesuitical” appeal to double effect to justify duelling,
Pascal remarked sardonically:
You have only to draw up a syllogism in due form, and, with
a direction of the intention, you may despatch your man at
once with a safe conscience. Thrice happy must those hot
spirits be who cannot bear with injuries, to be instructed in
this doctrine! But woe to the poor people who have offended
them! Indeed . . . it would be better to have to do with persons
who have no religion at all than with those who have been
taught this system.52
Centuries later Glanville Williams echoed the point, remarking that if
double effect “means that the necessity of making a choice of values can
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53. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 286. H. L. A. Hart makes the same point, asserting that any
attempt to morally distinguish between intentionally causing an effect and unintentionally causing
that same effect as a foreseen but unintended result “can only be explained as the result of a
legalistic conception of morality.” H. L. A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125 (1968).
54. Alison McIntyre, Doing Away with Double Effect, 111 ETHICS 219 (2001).
55. Id. at 219. McIntyre provides the following examples: (1) Terror/Strategic Bombers: The
terror bomber intentionally and impermissibly targets civilians, while the strategic bomber
permissibly and intentionally aims at military targets, merely foreseeing that he will kill civilians
in the process; (2) Assisted Suicide/Pain Relief: One doctor impermissibly injects morphine
intending to kill the patient, while another doctor permissibly injects morphine intending to relieve
the patient’s pain, knowing this will unintentionally hasten the patient’s death; (3)
Abortion/Hysterectomy: A doctor impermissibly intentionally kills a fetus to save the life of the
mother, while a doctor permissibly and intentionally removes the cancerous uterus of a pregnant
woman merely foreseeing that the act causes the death of the fetus; (4) Pre-Emptive Killing/Self-
Defense: A man who knows another is plotting his death and intentionally kills that other person
before he strikes would act impermissibly, but a man who defended himself against a deadly attack,
merely foreseeing that the blow would be fatal, would act permissibly; and (5) Trolley Car:
Throwing an innocent person before a runaway trolley to save five others would be impermissible,
but diverting a train away from a track containing five people to a track containing only one person,
knowing that one person would die as a result, would be permissible. Id. at 219-20.
56. Id. at 220.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
be avoided merely by keeping your mind off one of the consequences, it
can only encourage a hypocritical attitude towards moral problems.”53
In Doing Away with Double Effect, Alison McIntyre offers a
contemporary critique of the principle.54 Although admitting that “many
morally reflective people have been persuaded that something along the
lines of DE [double effect] must be correct” because of the “intuitive
appeal” of its illustrations,55 McIntyre rejects the principle arguing that
such acceptance stems from understandable, albeit erroneous, ethical
concerns.56
First, she suggests that ethically reflective persons, when confronted by
assertions that moral absolutes do not exist, are motivated to secure some
rational basis for ethical distinctions.57 McIntyre believes that these
persons, focusing on the contrast between intentionally caused harms and
merely foreseen harms, precipitously conclude that this contrast “commits
one to accepting a secular version of DE which would explain why the
prohibited option is impermissible.”58
Second, McIntyre suggests that misguided adherence to double effect
also arises as an overreaction to claims that no ethical significance attaches
to the distinction between merely foreseen and intended harms.59 Because
at least in some contexts this distinction has relevance to assessing an
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60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 221.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 221. This limitation combines two related constraints offered by McIntyre: (1) “A
principle of proportionality is often mentioned in this connection, but this must amount to more
than the simple requirement to weigh the value of the good end to be achieved against the disvalue
of the harmful side effect,” id. at 221, and (2) “The agent must be disposed to minimize harms that
are brought about as a side effect,” id. at 224.
65. Id. at 226. “Double Effect is not concerned with what agents intend to bring about as
ends, or with their motives or ultimate aims; it is limited to a contrast between harms intended as
actor’s responsibility, these persons erroneously conclude that the
significance of the distinction is properly captured by double effect.60
In McIntyre’s view, however, the illustrations of double effect support
neither inference:
The examples adduced to support DE often do illustrate a
moral contrast that can be expressed using the distinction
between intention and foresight, but not the particular
distinction between intending to bring about harm
instrumentally and bringing about harm incidentally as a
foreseen side effect that is supposed to serve as the
normatively neutral ground of DE. . . . [A] careful account of
the moral contrasts illustrated by these examples will
undermine rather than support DE.61
Elaborating this thesis, McIntyre offers a series of limitations, or as she
refers to them, “constraints,” upon double effect that she maintains any
reasonable proponent of double effect should accept.62 “The fact that a
harm was brought about as a merely foreseen side effect of pursuing a
good end does not, all by itself, show that it was brought about
permissibly. Other conditions of permissibility must be applied.”63
For purpose of brevity, McIntyre’s “constraints” may be summarized
as follows:
Constraint 1. In double effect, a proportion must exist
between the benefit(s) to be achieved by bringing about the
good effect in comparison with the evil effect(s) caused. This
constraint includes a duty to minimize the evil effect(s) when
reasonably possible.64
Constraint 2. Double effect is concerned with the
permissibility of causing “harms foreseen as side effects of
promoting a good end” and excluding the causing of “harms
intended as means to a good end.”65 Double effect
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means to a good end and harms foreseen as side effects of promoting a good end.” Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 237. This limitation incorporates a similar constraint offered by McIntyre:
Cases in which an agent may permissibly allow a harm to occur as a consequence
of inaction but could not permissibly intend to bring about the harm as a means
to a good end do not confirm DE but, rather, demonstrate the moral significance
of the distinction between causing and allowing.
Id. at 229.
68. Id. at 233. “In addition, the standard for what counts as intended must not be so narrow
as to count any regrettable aspect of one’s means as a consequence that is merely foreseen.” Id. at
233.
69. See supra note 48.
presupposes that an agent may not permissibly intend evil as
an end.66
Constraint 3. Double effect is not concerned with
instances when a foreseen effect is neither an intended end
nor a chosen means and “is one that an agent need not attend
to, because it is not his responsibility, or should not attend to,
because the agent has some reason to set it aside when
deliberating . . . . DE does not apply to explain the
permissibility of bringing it about.”67
Constraint 4. In order to apply double effect, there must be
some reasoned basis for distinguishing what an agent intends
as a means and as an end from what is merely foreseen that
does not prejudge permissibility.68
Upon close scrutiny of these limitations, McIntyre believes that it becomes
evident that an action’s permissibility depends not upon application of the
intended-foreseen distinction, but rather upon satisfaction of these
additional constraints. For McIntyre, the basic premise of double effect is
not so much wrong as superfluous.
Before considering the particulars of McIntyre’s attempt to deconstruct
double effect, however, it can be noted generally that her qualification of
the principle by the addition of further limitations beyond the
intended/foreseen distinction offers nothing original to the discussion. As
seen both in Aquinas’s discussion and in modern formulation of double
effect, the intended/foreseen distinction, although a necessary and
fundamental condition, does not exhaust the required analysis. Conditions
very similar to those proposed by McIntyre are included in most reflective
accounts of double effect.69
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70. See infra Part IV.A.2.
71. McIntyre, supra note 54, at 221.
72. See id. at 223.
73. Id. at 224-25.
74. See id. at 223.
75. Id. at 228.
76. As McIntyre states it, double effect proposes that:
[a] doctor who intends to hasten the death of a terminally ill patient by injecting
a large dose of morphine would act impermissibly because he intends to bring
The inferences, however, that McIntyre attempts to draw from these
constraints are indeed novel. For purposes of this analysis, the limitations
can be broken down into two categories. Constraint 1 and Constraint 2, on
their terms, apply generally to every case of double effect and, as will be
shown below, constitute the foundation for McIntyre’s general rejection
of the principle. Constraint 3 and Constraint 4, however, address
difficulties associated with the application of double effect only in cases
of special complexity. Accordingly, the following Part will focus
discussion on Constraint 1 and Constraint 2 and their function in
McIntyre’s general effort to undermine double effect. The limitations
found in Constraint 3 and Constraint 4 will be taken up in Part IV, dealing
with particular application of double effect in Quill.70
1.  The Intended/Foreseen Distinction
McIntyre asserts that critical reflection upon Constraint 1 and
Constraint 2 reveals that the intended/foreseen distinction as understood
by double effect is not in fact relevant to ethical assessment of action.
Rather, satisfying the other conditions performs the heavy ethical lifting.
With respect to Constraint 1, McIntyre reiterates that under double
effect, one does not determine permissibility solely by the fact that he or
she intends some good end and only foreseeably causes harm.71 Rather, the
intended good also must provide a reason sufficient to justify causing the
unintended evil effect.72 In elaborating this condition, McIntyre correctly
stresses that this responsibility includes the elimination of any unnecessary
harm involved in attaining one’s intended end.73
McIntyre, however, immediately questions why the intended/foreseen
distinction remains relevant.74 Once an actor determines that the intended
good is reasonable in light of the minimal amount of foreseen but
unintended harm that will be caused to bring it about, McIntyre suggests
that under the same conditions, it is difficult to see why a person could not
intentionally cause that harm to bring about the good effect.75 Referring
specifically to the alleged ethical contrast between physician-assisted
suicide and palliative care,76 she states,
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about the patient’s death. However, a doctor who intended to relieve the patient’s
pain with that same dose and merely foresaw the hastening of the patient’s death
would act permissibly.
Id. at 219.
77. Id. at 223.
78. Id. at 228 (“Double Effect itself does not provide the grounds for condemning someone
who acts with malicious aims.”).
Once all this is spelled out, the skeptic about DE can ask:
“Is it really true that under similar circumstances death could
not be brought about intentionally in order to cut short the
patient’s suffering?” Proponents of DE must be able to show
that the justification for causing harm as a side effect would
not also apply to causing the same kind of harm, in similar
circumstances, as a means to the same good end.77
In short, if double effect concedes that it is permissible to cause the death
of the patient as a side effect in view of an intended good effect, why
would it not be permissible under those same circumstances to
intentionally kill the patient as a means to that good effect?
2.  Willing Evil as a “Means” Versus Willing Evil as an “End”
Because the inference McIntyre draws from Constraint 1 is that it
would be permissible to intentionally kill the patient in order to relieve
pain—she logically turns to consideration of Constraint 2’s proscription
against intending evil to achieve a good effect. McIntyre first notes that
double effect does not provide a rationale for prohibiting action aimed at
evil ends.78 Instead, double effect is concerned primarily with
distinguishing impermissible cases of intending harm as a means to a good
effect, which the principle always condemns, from unintentionally causing
harm as a side effect of the pursuit of some intended good, which double
effect sometimes permits.
McIntyre argues, however, that double effect cannot so facilely “co-
opt” the noncontroversial ethical prohibition against intending evil as an
end—intending evil as one’s “goal”—to justify why willing evil as a
means is also wrong:
Presumably, we all condemn those who act with evil motives
and aim at harm as an end or as a means to an evil
end. . . . Because it distinguishes DE from an uncontroversial
moral platitude, [Constraint 2] clarifies just what it is that
proponents of DE must supply in providing a rationale for it:
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a justification for linking the wrongfulness of certain cases of
instrumental harming to the wrongfulness of acting on
malicious aims.79
In McIntyre’s view, double effect conflates without justification the
wrongfulness of willing evils as “ends” with willing evils as “means.”80
“In giving a rationale for DE, many authors assimilate intending as a
means to intending as an end.”81 McIntyre observes that an actor who wills
evil only instrumentally can experience exactly the same regret and
reluctance that the double effect actor does when causing unintended
foreseen harms, a fact that she believes reveals the error of double effect
on this point:
To intend harm only as a means to some good end is
compatible with feelings of regret, reluctance, and, in short, a
range of attitudes that would also be present in cases in which
harmful side effects are present. Opponents of DE typically
argue that a properly regretful agent with a clear-sighted grasp
of just why she was causing a particular harm as a means to a
good end would be able to acquit herself of the particular
moral charge of manifesting a bad attitude or, more precisely,
a worse attitude than what would be manifested if the harm
were brought about as a side effect and so merely foreseen.82
In view of these observations, McIntyre concludes that double effect’s
identification of the wrongfulness of willing evil “as an end” with the
wrongfulness of willing evil “as a means” begs the question. If proponents
of double effect assert that “instrumental intending [i.e., intending an evil as
a means] shares all of the objectionable characteristics of aiming at harm as
an end, then skeptics about DE may well accuse [its proponents] of simply
begging the question.”83 If double effect’s only explanation of what is wrong
with willing evil as a means is that it is wrong to will evil as an end, then
double effect begs the question in face of an assertion that there is a relevant
distinction between the two: “If that same side effect could permissibly be
brought about as a means, then DE may not be in play at all.”84
In sum, McIntyre argues that if a proportionate reason justifies bringing
about some evil as an unintentional but foreseen side effect of pursuing some
intended good, this suggests that, absent other concerns, intentionally
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87. Id. As the idea is reiterated in an amicus brief (referred to as the “philosopher’s brief”)
filed on behalf of the plaintiffs in Quill: “If it is permissible for a doctor deliberately to withdraw
medical treatment in order to allow death to result from a natural process, then it is equally
permissible for him to help his patient hasten his own death more actively, if that is the patient’s
express wish.” Brief of Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae at 11-12, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997) (No. 95-1858), reprinted in 255 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 23, at 168, 178-79.
bringing about that harm as a means to that good effect also should be
justified. The only concern is double effect’s proscription against intending
evil as a means. In response, McIntyre asserts that opponents of double effect
simply can assert that willing evil as a means constitutes a different case from
willing it as an end.85 In such instances, the actor need not desire the intended
means for its own sake, but regretfully, and only in order to bring about the
intended good. In support of this conclusion, opponents of double effect can
point to the fact that the very evil intended as a means is precisely the same
evil that proponents of double effect are willing to cause, albeit as a side
effect, to achieve that good effect.
This logic, in fact, parallels that underlying the plaintiffs’ equal protection
claim in Quill. Because certain accepted medical procedures carried out with
respect to terminally ill patients result in their foreseeable but unintended
death, plaintiffs assert that it should make no difference if that effect is
directly intended as the means in physician-assisted suicide.86 As the Second
Circuit stated:
New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons alike:
those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-
support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing
the removal of such systems; but those who are similarly
situated, except for the . . . attachment of life-sustaining
equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-
administering prescribed drugs.87
According to this argument, conflating the cases is proper because the
harm—the death of the patient—is justified by a similar good caused in
each case—the relief of suffering. Whether death comes about as a mere
side effect or functions as the intended means of bringing about that good
effect is allegedly irrelevant.
3.  Begging the Question
McIntyre’s critique pointedly challenges double effect’s supposition
that intending evil as a means is ethically distinct from causing it as a
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88. McIntyre, supra note 54, at 242.
89. Id. Following this concession, McIntyre proposes still another argument against double
effect based on attempts to apply the doctrine double of effect to a particularly problematic set of
cases. Id. Based on her objection that the employment of double effect in these examples
purportedly contradicts itself, McIntyre submits that double effect is undermined:
These examples show that absolutists have not consistently interpreted DE as a
prohibition on instrumental harming . . . . And insofar as these examples have
persuaded nonabsolutists that there is something to the use of the
[intended/foreseen] distinction in DE that is correct, they show that some
examples cited as confirming illustrations of DE actually undermine it.
Id.
Without engaging in tangential discussion of whether application of double effect to these
examples is incoherent, critique of double effect based on its employment with respect to a limited
subset of difficult cases does not undermine the general validity of the principle. A proponent of
double effect simply could agree with McIntyre that double effect has been erroneously applied in
those cases without putting the general validity of the principle into question. For further discussion
of McIntyre’s limitation in Constraint 4 and the “closeness” problem, see infra note 340 and
accompanying text.
foreseen side effect. At the same time, however, it is obvious that her
denial of a meaningful distinction between the two falls subject to the
same question-begging critique. If it is correct that double effect merely
assumes that an ethical connection exists between intending evil as an end
and intending it as a means, McIntyre’s bald denial of any connection is
just as ineffectual.
McIntyre in fact in the end concedes that her argument fails to
undermine double effect’s position that it does make a difference whether
an actor intends evil as a means or merely foresees it as a side effect.88 She
recognizes that, even if proponents of double effect accepted all of her
additional constraints, which many of them do, they still could insist that
the intended/foreseen distinction remains a necessary condition of
permissibility:
Proponents of the doctrine could concede much of this while
also claiming that the special force of DE is to set limits on
the absolute prohibition on intentional harming. . . . [T]he
proponent might argue, even though DE might need to be
supplemented with other principles or claims to explain the
permissibility of some cases of incidental harming, that does
not show it to be otiose.89
E.  The Meaning of Intention
McIntyre’s concession, however, does not render her efforts entirely
futile. Her argument is valuable precisely because it highlights the need for
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(emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Proponents of double effect concerned with articulating its contours have not always
focused on this broader issue. See, e.g., Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Praeter Intentionem in Aquinas, 42
THOMIST 649, 650 (1978) (“[W]hy should the difference between what one intends and what one
foresees but does not intend be important for the definition and moral evaluation of kinds of human
acts? This . . . question requires a long answer; I will set it aside . . . .”). But see supra note 32 and
accompanying text for Boyle’s elaboration of a positive account of why the intended/foreseen
distinction makes an ethical difference, articulated in more detail in the cited article.
clarification of double effect’s claims about the relation between means,
ends, and side effects and their relative moral import. In light of the
preceding discussion, it becomes evident that two distinct, albeit related,
difficulties arise with respect to double effect. First, assuming satisfaction
of its other elements, double effect must explain why causing evil as a
foreseen side effect differs ethically from intending evil as an end; and
second, having established the reasonability of that distinction, double
effect must explain why, in a situation where evil could permissibly be
caused as a side effect, it could not be intended as a means. In short,
double effect must navigate a narrow obstacle course. As suggested by
McIntyre’s attempted deconstruction, double effect must offer a coherent
account for why causing evil is permissible in one case but not in the
other.
1.  Practical Reason: Intention and Side Effects
Dealing first with differentiating between responsibility for intended
effects and foreseen consequences of action, one philosopher has
described the puzzle presented as “the problem of the package deal”:90
Suppose a rational agent believes that his A-ing would result
in a bad effect, E, seriously considers E in his deliberation
about whether to A, and yet still goes on to make a choice in
favor of A-ing. How could such an agent fail to intend to
bring about E?91
This statement of the problem properly focuses attention on the
necessity for double effect to clarify how an actor may be understood not
to intend a result even when that consequence is foreseen to follow from
conduct. The answer to this question hinges naturally on what the notion
“to intend” entails and the role that intentions play in constituting personal
responsibility.92 In short, even the most elaborate and extended critiques
of double effect reduce to fundamental questions about the nature of
“intention.”
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Although etymological interpretation sometimes can be misleading, in
this context it provides a helpful starting point for discussion. The term
“intention” traces to the Latin intendere: to hold out, point, stretch out (the
hand, finger, arm, etc. towards or at); to direct the eyes, sight, hearing etc.;
to direct one’s steps, set out (for); to be aimed or to point to a particular
object; to direct one’s efforts or activities, turn (to); to aim at, purpose.93
The common notion shared by all these examples is a movement or
“reaching” (Latin “-tend”) exercised with respect to or “toward” (Latin
“in-”) some perceived object—some person, place, or thing.
Contemporary philosophical notions of intention corroborate this
etymological sense. To intend or to have an intention implies that an agent
inclines or “tends” toward some specific object grasped cognitionally.
Contemporary theorists develop this notion more precisely by asserting
that intentional action is characterized as acting “for a reason”: “For all
actions A, A is an intentional action only if A’s agent had a reason for A-
ing and (his having) that reason was a cause of his A-ing.”94
Elaborating this notion of a “reason” by way of illustration, a guest
might respond to a host’s question, “Why did you knock my glass over?”
by answering that his hand was pushed, he was bumped, he had a spasm,
or some other similar explanation. By such responses, the guest, though
acknowledging being the physical cause of the spill, would deny personal
responsibility and thus culpability for the glass being spilled. The guest,
however, also might respond, “Because I saw the waiter slip some powder
into your glass, and you were about to drink it.” Here, the actor offers a
description of his cognitive state to indicate that he meant to knock over
the glass—that cognition explains why he did it. By answering the
question, “Why did you do X?” in this way, however, an agent implies that
his mental state offers an explanation for why he should be held personally
responsible for what happened. If it were not so, offering a description of
one’s mental state in response to the question “why?” would be a non
sequitur. Further, the host’s acceptance of the response presupposes that
he or she appreciates the explanatory force of the reason given.
It is, however, at the same time true that the guest’s answer fails to
provide a complete explanation for why an agent acts. Purely descriptive
accounts of some perceived state of the world, such as the guest’s simple
awareness that the waiter had slipped powder into the host’s drink and the
host was about to drink it, does not fully explain why the guest tries to do
anything about it. The same cognitively grasped state of affairs could, for
example, equally provide a guest with a reason for not tipping the glass
over, e.g., if the guest were heir apparent to the host’s fortune.
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96. See ANSCOMBE, supra note 50, § 35, at 66 (“The role of ‘wanting’ in the practical
syllogism is quite different from that of a premise. It is that whatever is described in the proposition
that is the starting-point of the argument must be wanted in order for the reasoning to lead to any
action.”); 1 ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 641, 688 (Jonathan
Barnes ed., 1984) (circa 350 B.C.): “[T]hought is never found producing movement without
appetite.” (“nun de ho men nous ou phainetai kinôn aneu orexeôs.”).
97. “The concept designated by the verb ‘to want’ is extraordinarily elusive. A statement of
the form ‘A wants to X’—taken by itself, apart from a context that serves to amplify or to specify
its meaning—conveys remarkably little information.” Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and
the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 7 (1971), reprinted in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 65, 67 (John
Martin Fischer ed., 1986). Gary Watson, in the same context states, “I am going to use ‘want’ and
‘desire’ in the very inclusive sense now familiar in philosophy, whereby virtually any motivational
factor that may figure in the explanation of intentional action is a want.” Gary Watson, Free
Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205, 207 n.2 (1975), reprinted in MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra, at 80, 83 n.2.
Other terms which have been employed by philosophers in the attempt to capture this notion are:
“appetite” (‘orexis’ from ‘oregein’: to stretch out for, reach toward), ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at
688, and “pro-attitude,” DONALD DAVIDSON, Intending, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 83,
83 (1980).
98. See, e.g., Donald Davidson, How is Weakness of the Will Possible?, in ESSAYS ON
ACTIONS AND EVENTS, supra note 97, at 21, 31.
In addition then to purely descriptive knowledge about possible states
of affairs, other psychic factors must be introduced to explain why an
agent chooses to do something—to explain why a person acts for a reason.
As one philosopher observes:
In itself the fact that Helen wonderfully resembles the
immortal gods will not lead anyone to consort with her or the
fact that the pool contains crocodiles lead swimmers to vacate
it; these will be reasons only to persons who desire charming
companions or are averse to being eaten.95
Appetitive factors, referred to in this text as “desire” and “aversion,”
bridge the gap between simple cognitional awareness and intention.96 Of
course, the concepts of “appetition,” “motivation,” or “wanting” are
themselves notoriously opaque.97 It suffices for present purposes to
observe that any rudimentary attempt to understand intention demands
reference to a complex of psychic elements. Only taken together can these
elements account for why an actor, by means of “an intention,” not only
cognitively grasps some state of affairs but also acts to make that state of
affairs obtain. For conduct to be intentional it must be caused both by
knowledge and desire.
Contemporary “belief-desire” models of intentional action capture the
operation of both factors.98 Donald Davidson provides a standard sketch:
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100. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Complicity, Cause, and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation
of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323, 326-30 (1985):
Events in the physical world follow one another with an inevitability, or natural
necessity, that is conspicuously absent from our view of voluntary human
actions. . . . Thus, the conception of causation appropriate to physical events is out
of place in the human realm.
. . . .
. . . Human actions stand on an entirely different footing. . . . Except in special
circumstances, [an agent] possesses volition through which he is free to choose his
actions. He may be influenced in his choices, but influences do not work like wind
upon a straw. . . . [H]is actions are his and his alone, not those of his genes or his
rearing, because if he had so desired he could have chosen to do otherwise. This
is the perception that underlies the conception of responsibility . . . .
Id. at 326-27, 330.
When a person acts with an intention, the following seems to
be a true, if rough and incomplete, description of what goes
on: he sets a positive value on some state of affairs (an end,
or the performance by himself of an action satisfying certain
conditions); he believes (or knows or perceives) that an
action, of a kind open to him to perform, will promote or
produce or realize the valued state of affairs; and so he acts
(that is, he acts because of his value or desire and his belief).
Generalized and refined, this description has seemed to many
philosophers, from Aristotle on, to promise to give an
analysis of what it is to act with an intention; to illuminate
how we explain an action by giving the reasons the agent had
in acting; and to provide the beginning of an account of
practical reasoning, i.e. reasoning about what to do, reasoning
that leads to action.99
2.  Intention and Responsibility
Based on such an understanding of intention, its relation to the
constitution of personal responsibility can be understood more clearly. A
variety of mental states of mind, or even no state of mind at all, can satisfy
mere efficient causality. If merely bringing about results in the world
appropriately grounded personal responsibility, an agent could be held
ethically responsible for all effects of action—be they intended, negligent,
purely fortuitous, or even unconscious. Personal responsibility, however,
implies more than simply being an efficient cause of effects.
Agents are held personally responsible in the strongest and most
precise sense only for deliberate intentional conduct.100 This is true
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101. As Carlos Moya states:
Our account of human intentional action includes the subjective point of view of
a reflective agent. The ability to commit oneself to act goes hand in hand with the
ability to make one’s own desires and other sorts of reasons objects of reflection
and evaluation. This reflective capacity allows human agents to place their own
desires and urges at a distance and to judge them worth pursuing or not. . . . This
is one sense in which agents can be said to be the source of their own actions,
independently of the past history of the world.
CARLOS J. MOYA, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION 168-69 (1990). In a similar vein, Harry Frankfurt
observes:
The ability to care requires a type of psychic complexity that may be peculiar
to the members of our species. By its very nature, caring manifests and depends
upon our distinctive capacity to have thoughts, desires, and attitudes that are about
our own attitudes, desires, and thoughts. In other words, it depends upon the fact
that the human mind is reflexive.
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE REASONS OF LOVE 17 (2004).
precisely because when acting intentionally, understood in the sense
described, a person causes possible states of affairs to come about
because—and this is the crucial factor—the actor affirmatively wants and
chooses those specific, cognitively grasped states to be made real. In
choosing to engage in certain types of conduct or produce particular
effects because of one’s beliefs and desires—an intention—an actor is
psychologically connected in a unique causal mode with the very realities
he or she “creates.” By such conduct, the actor identifies and participates
in the very value of the objects intended. In short, attribution of personal
responsibility is nothing more than recognition of the actor’s causal
identification with the objects of intention—the awareness that, by
intentionally causing effects, agents reflexively express and establish their
own ethical character.101
Consideration of the role played in practical deliberation by merely
foreseeable effects, however, carries with it no set of comparable
implications. The term “foreseen” denotes precisely the limited role that
such awareness plays in the consciousness of the actor. “To foresee”
bespeaks a purely cognitive grasp of some possible state of affairs without
any corresponding appetitive inclination. “Foreseen effects” are identified
as such precisely because they provide no focal point for an actor’s
volitions or desires. In fact, to the contrary, the notion of simple
foreseeability suggests that the actor, though aware of those possible states
of affairs, lacks any affirmative volitional disposition toward them.
Thus, the notion of a foreseen effect denotes implicit denial of any
identification between those results and the desires and beliefs of the actor.
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Because it is precisely an affirmative cognitional and volitional movement
toward objects that captures the essence of intent, it makes no sense to
refer to merely foreseen effects as objects of intention. Actors cannot, for
example, be said with respect to merely foreseen effects to be trying to
bring those states of affairs about.
Whether one chooses to call foreseen consequences mere “side
effects,” “unintended effects,” or, as some do, “obliquely inten[ded]” or
“indirectly inten[ded]”102 makes no distinction in reality. Their import is
the same: a fundamental distinction exists between choosing objects of
practical reason and desire in their own right and bringing about effects
that are not desired by the actor in their own right but are merely foreseen
to result from the pursuit of intended objects.
3.  Side Effects and Responsibility
Such a view, however, does not entail that causing unintended foreseen
effects is ipso facto permissible. Instead, all that discussion thus far
establishes is that causing such effects cannot be understood as wrong
because it is intentional. This distinction may, however, as J.L. Austin
noted with respect to excuses, only get one “out of the fire into the frying
pan.”103
In such cases, however, it is true that the wrongfulness of the conduct
does not have superadded upon it the same moral blameworthiness as
would be the case if the harm were caused intentionally. Though the actor
may be culpable because he or she intended some good unreasonable in
light of the evil caused, he or she was not the type of person that brought
that effect about because he or she wanted to cause it. As John Finnis
states in this context, “One may well be culpable in accepting [such
foreseen effects]. But the ground of culpability will not be that one
intended them, but that one wrongly—unfairly—accepted them as
incidents of what one did intend.”104 In fact, negative ethical judgments
can attach to cases of causing merely foreseeable but unintended effects
whenever the harmfulness of the side effect is unjustified in view of the
good intended. And it is precisely in these circumstances that double effect
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becomes relevant—in the attempt to evaluate when it is permissible to
cause foreseen harm though intentionally aiming at a permissible good
effect.
Returning to consider the strategic/terror bomber scenario in light of
this analysis,105 the death of innocent civilians may be understood from the
point of view of the strategic bomber as an unavoidable, yet tragic and
unintended, effect of destroying the enemy munitions plant. The death of
civilians, although caused in fact by the agent’s action, is not in any way
grasped as a cognitional object that the agent affirmatively aims at
constituting in reality as an object valued in itself either as an end or as a
means. That is, it is not something the agent intends.106 Accordingly, under
double effect, if the munitions plant is of sufficient strategic importance
to a nation’s war effort to protect its citizens from harm, under most
accepted ethical standards of conduct, bombing such a facility would be
permissible despite the foreseen consequences for nearby civilians.107
The importance of this fine-grained analysis of the ethical significance
of intent cannot be overstated. Superficial discussions of intention and
foreknowledge often disparage such terminological considerations as
matters of arbitrary definition rooted in abstract interpretations of human
behavior. In reality, the distinctions considered here constitute elementary
descriptions of common interior experience of practical reasoning and
choice. Direct introspection validates the experience of a uniquely
powerful form of causality under personal control—the experience of
successfully effecting states of affairs in the world as a direct result of
one’s affirmative belief-desire state. “Intent,” taken strictly, is the name
reserved for that particular causal phenomenon. Such definition, by its
terms, explicitly prescinds from anything else that may be “caused” or
“come to be” or “be brought about” by an actor’s conduct and relegates
such effects to the category of “unintended.”
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4.  Intending Evil as a “Means” and Culpability
Having provided a reasoned basis for distinguishing the moral import
of intending ends versus merely foreseeing side effects, however, skeptics
of double effect, like McIntyre, can understandably demand an explanation
for why, if double effect concedes that causing an evil effect can be
justified by an intended good, that same harm cannot permissibly be
intended as a means to that good effect. As McIntyre queried, if one may
ease pain by use of palliative therapy that is foreseen to end life, why is it
not permissible to end life in order to relieve pain?108 If willing a means is
distinguishable from willing an end, it arguably is not obvious that
intending evil as a means to a good end is always wrong, especially when
double effect would allow that same evil to be knowingly caused as a
foreseen side effect of pursuing that same intended good.
The logical subordination of a means to an end is indeed an important
ethical insight that McIntyre correctly highlights.109 As reflected in
Davidson’s description of practical reasoning quoted above,110 choice of
any particular act as a means is made possible only by discernment that
that act is “of a kind open to him to perform, [and] will promote or
produce or realize the valued state of affairs.”111 In other words, means as
such are good because they are “instrumental”—in one way or another, to
greater or lesser degree, causally lead to the intended end. 
The conclusion McIntyre attempts to draw from this, however, is
overreaching. No dispute exists that the ethical character of an intended
end often redounds to specify ethical evaluation of a means chosen to
achieve that end. If, for example, the goal sought to be achieved through
some chosen means were evil, the means-act directed at that end would be
ethically condemned precisely because of its role in bringing about that
evil. For example, if a person’s motivation for donating to an orphanage
were to gain access for predatory sexual behavior, it is noncontroversial
that those particular acts of almsgiving would be ethically flawed, though
almsgiving considered in itself be praiseworthy.
Double effect, however, recognizes that the ethical resonance of ends
upon means is circumscribed and often asymmetrical. In cases, for
example, where evil means are employed to achieve good ends, it is not
true that the moral goodness of those ends exhaustively specifies the
ethical character of the means. Shooting the rich and stealing their money
cannot be justified merely by putting the money to good use in funding an
orphanage, even if one sincerely wants to help the children.
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112. Such an argument involves a type of “fallacy of the consequent.” Cf. JOHN A. OESTERLE,
LOGIC: THE ART OF DEFINING AND REASONING 258 (2d ed. 1963). If it is raining outside, the ground
must be wet, does not entail that if it is not-raining outside, the ground is not wet. There may be
other reasons why the ground is wet. Id.
113. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
114. McIntyre, supra note 54, at 229; see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
This result is not anomalous, however, because the constraint that
conduct be aimed at a good purpose is only one of the necessary
conditions for ethical permissibility. Although it is clear that if an end is
evil it follows that means directed at that end are unethical, it is a basic
logical error to conclude that simply because an end is not evil, the means
to that end also must not be evil.112
Double effect’s first element recognizes this complexity, providing that
the means chosen by the agent must be in itself ethically neutral or
praiseworthy considered apart from evaluation of its effects.113 Ulterior
motives or purposes of conduct cannot be the sole criterion for ethical
evaluation of chosen means, which require independent normative
assessment in themselves.
Thus, McIntyre’s claim that simply because an unintended side effect
may be permissible under double effect that therefore the same evil may
be intended as a means to the good is seriously put into question. A
means—though constituted as such because of the end to which it is
directed—cannot in its ethical evaluation be reduced merely to a question
of the ethical character of the end.
The very mobility of the means-end model of practical reasoning
employed by McIntyre to undermine double effect further confirms the
applicability of this critique to her argument. Analysis of the malleability
of practical reasoning, in fact, provides a specific response to McIntyre’s
demand that a proponent of double effect provide “a justification for
linking the wrongfulness of . . . instrumental harming to the wrongfulness
of acting on malicious aims.”114
The weakness of McIntyre’s argument lies in its failure to appreciate
the pliable and transitory nature of the means-end relation. What is a
means or end in one phase of practical deliberation often plays a different
role in other phases of deliberation. In view of this fact, McIntyre gives up
nothing ethically by conceding that it is always wrong to intend evil as an
end but permissible to intend evil as a means.
a.  Means as Ends
Seldom, in fact, is it the case that what is chosen as a means in one
stage of practical deliberation fails to function as an intended end with
respect to a subsequent phase. This point can again be illustrated by
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115. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
116. “[O]pponents of DE can readily accept that there is a general moral prohibition on aiming
at harm as an end.” McIntyre, supra note 54, at 226; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
reference to the bombing scenario.115 Although McIntyre does not return
to this example in her later arguments, her thesis would require the
conclusion that if double effect would allow an enemy to be permissibly
weakened by the bombing of a munitions plant at the cost of foreseen but
unintended deaths of innocent civilians, then it is permissible to weaken
the enemy by intentionally killing those civilians.
In both cases the ultimate ethically unobjectionable end sought by the
strategic and terror bombardiers is identical—the end of war and domestic
peace. Further deliberations about this end, however, uncover for the
actors various ways that victory might be achieved. Among these options,
two appear most likely to accomplish the goal: weakening the enemy by
diminishing its military capacity or demoralizing the enemy’s will to fight
by killing large numbers of innocent civilians.
Whichever alternative is selected, however, further deliberation is
required concerning how to achieve that as an end—how best to diminish
military capacity for the strategic bomber or how to kill civilians for the
terror bomber. The necessity of engaging in specific means deliberation
concerning the killing of innocent civilians patently illustrates that, in such
a case, the actor must indeed become fixed in both thought and desire on
killing civilians in a way that the strategic bomber does not. Killing
innocent civilians becomes for the terror bomber a specific goal of
practical reason that plays an integral, not incidental, part of his or her plan
for victory.
Even though ulterior motives may exist behind killing civilians that
provide a “non-evil” motive for that choice, in the specific, discrete choice
of how to accomplish such killing—the choice to bomb in order to kill
innocents—the agent intends killing civilians as an end. By so acting,
however, the actor brings about the killing of civilians in precisely the
affirmative volitionally constitutive manner that McIntyre concedes makes
willing evil as an end wrong.116
b.  Ends as Means
McIntyre’s attempt to distinguish willing evil as a means from willing
evil as an end is also flawed for a parallel reason. McIntyre’s analysis
appears consistent with more conventional ethical theories in conceding
that evil can never be intended as an end. If, for example, the question
were abstractly posed about whether it was ethically permissible to
intentionally kill an innocent person, McIntyre might be expected to agree
that such an end is impermissible.
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The problem, however, is that any significance to her concession that
it is always wrong to intend evil as an end evaporates when placed in a
context in which any particular evil can always be construed to function
as a mere means to some ulterior good. Take, for example, the sinking of
an oceanliner. Assuming the absence of a sufficient number of life
preservers for the complement of passengers, double effect could
conceivably justify one passenger claiming a preserver for his child even
though foreseeing that such conduct would unintentionally but inevitably
result in the death of another passenger. Under double effect, the death of
the passenger would arguably be a permissible but unintended side effect
of the first passenger’s choice. However, under no circumstances could a
passenger intentionally kill another passenger in order to obtain access to
his life preserver.
Under McIntyre’s thesis, however, contrary to what might initially
have been assumed by her concession that it is never permissible to intend
harm as an end,117 it apparently would be permissible for the first
passenger to intentionally kill the second passenger in order to assure his
or her own survival. As long as one can analyze the harm done as a means
and not an end, any harm, no matter what type, can be justified under the
right circumstances.
As the preceding examples illustrate, concrete evil actions, such as
killing innocents, can function either as intended ends toward which other
means are directed (e.g., bombing a munitions factory in order to kill
innocent civilians) or as an intended means by which some other end is
accomplished (e.g., killing innocent civilians in order to attain military
victory). Most conventional ethical theories would condemn such conduct
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uonsidered under either aspect. Under McIntyre’s theory, however, one
rbitrarily restricts one’s ethical evaluation to that phase of practical117. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
eliberation where the evil in question functions merely as a means to
ome more remote end.
Because, however, all conduct can be seen as motivated by very remote
ormal ends such as a general pursuit of happiness, self-fulfillment, well-
eing, or even the mere exercise of autonomy, conceding that it is always
rong to intend evil as an end provides no substantive limitation on ethical
onduct. None of these ultimate ends of conduct is wrong, and any
articular action arguably could be seen as a mere means to one of these
ltimate ends.
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118. “[T]he traditional principle of double effect . . . remains the right point of convergence
for efforts to capture our intuitions. The principle says that to violate deontological constraints one
must maltreat someone else intentionally.” THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 179 (1986)
(footnote call number omitted).
119. Id. at 3-12.
120. Nagel stated:
The detached, objective view takes in everything and provides a standpoint of
choice from which all choosers can agree about what should happen. But each of
us is not only an objective self but a particular person with a particular
perspective; we act in the world from that perspective, and not only from the point
of view of a detached will, selecting and rejecting world-states. So our choices are
not merely choices of states of the world, but of actions. Every choice is two
choices, and from the internal point of view, the pursuit of evil . . . looms large.
Id. at 183.
121. Nagel further stated:
The issue is whether the special, personal perspective of agency has legitimate
significance in determining what people have reason to do—whether, because of
this perspective, I can have sufficient reason not to do something which,
5.  Utilitarianism and Double Effect
Further, even if one were to limit the permissible range of evil means
to evils that overlap with unintended foreseen harmful effects that would
be permitted by double effect, the fact that one intentionally chooses those
evils carries with it an ethical import distinct from mere foreknowledge.
Choosing evil and intentionally making it part of one’s plan involves a
distinctly personal and intimate causal connection between the actor and
those evil effects.
Thomas Nagel corroborates this point, observing that double effect
captures an important distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral
reasons for acting.118 While alternative courses of action can be evaluated
from abstract or “objective” utilitarian frames of reference, Nagel argues
that such analysis excludes consideration of relevant normative limitations
applicable to human choices considered from the subjective point of view
of the acting person; such abstract views represent an agent-neutral “view
from nowhere.”119 While arguably it may from a general perspective be
true that it would be “better” if five persons live and only one die, that
fact, under normal ethical sensibilities, cannot justify intentionally killing
one innocent to accomplish that state of affairs.120
Instead, proper moral evaluation of action demands independent
normative assessment of the actor’s subjective—intentional—
responsibility for bringing particular effects about, an assessment that
sometimes may diverge from what an external judgment about the
goodness of comparative states of affairs would yield.121 In short,
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considered from an external standpoint, it would be better if I did. . . . If
considerations of what I may do, and the correlative claims of my victim against
me, can outweigh the substantial impersonal value of what will happen, that can
only be because the perspective of the agent has an importance in practical
reasoning that resists domination by a conception of the world as a place where
good and bad things happen whose value is perspective-free.
Id. at 180-81.
122. “Let us now consider . . . a moral distinction between what the agent ‘directly intends’,
that is what he aims at either as means or end, and what he ‘indirectly intends’ in foreseeing it as
a consequence of his action. The moral relevance of this distinction has often been challenged. I
think, however, that it must be allowed.” PHILLIPA FOOT, Morality, Action and Outcome, in MORAL
DILEMMAS 88, 91 (2002) (footnote omitted).
123. Id. at 92-93.
124. Id. at 95.
125. “[B]enevolence gives us no reason to say, for instance, that it would be a ‘good state of
affairs’ or ‘good total outcome’ if the sacrificing of a few experimental subjects allowed us to get
cancer under control.” Id. at 99.
126. See id.
127. Id.
evaluation of effects of action on the general state of affairs of the world
does not provide an adequate standard for judging the moral interior worth
of human choices.
Phillipa Foot makes a similar point in her critique of utilitarianism and
defense of double effect.122 She observes that utilitarian models of moral
goodness refer to judgments about whether the causal effect of action
maximizes general welfare, in whatever way that notion may be defined,
and thus purports to create the best state of affairs.123 Foot criticizes the
seeming irresistible rationality of this theory because the very concept of
moral goodness operative in it disassociates itself from the experience of
moral value giving meaning to that concept in the first place.124
While Foot acknowledges, for example, that it makes sense to advocate
that benevolence and justice be spread as extensively as possible
throughout society, she notes that the experience of being benevolent and
just provides no grounds for believing that such a maximized “state of
affairs” ought to be brought about by acts involving contrary virtues.125
Moral values are experienced as normative for individual acts and not in
the form of general admonitions about general “states of affairs.”126
“[M]oral injunctions can be like orders which say not ‘See to it that there
is less shouting’ (which might be obeyed by shouting) but rather ‘Don’t
shout.’”127
In response, then, to McIntyre’s demand for an explanation for why an
evil effect may not be intended as a means to a good effect though double
effect may permit that same foreseen effect if unintended, the preceding
considerations show that the utilitarian underpinning of her view fails to
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128. Nagel stated:
grasp the fundamental nature of intention and its relation to personal
culpability.
The fact that a particular “end” or state of affairs may be preferable in
the abstract does not allow an agent to intend to bring that state of affairs
about. A contrary position ignores the fact that achieving that objectively
preferred state entails intentional acts specifically directed at evil effects.
In so doing, it ignores the insight that an actor’s affirmative volitional
desire to bring about harmful consequences as means or ends constitutes
immoral or unethical choice in its primary form. Based on the
understanding of a unique personal culpability that flows from intentional
choices of evil as a means or end, nothing problematic is suggested by
double effect’s claim that foreseen evil effects may sometimes permissibly
be caused though not intended.
F.  Synopsis
Recent criticism of the principle of double effect argues that what
makes double effect initially plausible is an intuition that there are
important ethical implications suggested by the distinction between what
an actor intends and foresees. These philosophers, however, ultimately
conclude that despite this insight, it is not the principle of double effect but
other moral principles that correctly “corral” how those factors determine
moral permissibility. In short, these critiques assert that double effect
reduces to application of more basic ethical principles.
In response to the challenges to double effect presented by the
“package deal” argument and McIntyre’s allegations of question-begging,
proponents of double effect can point to the preceding account of
intentional action. An agent’s intention with respect to both ends and
means establishes distinct ethical import flowing from the intended
causing of effects as distinguished from the causing of merely foreseen
effects.
The ethical significance of this distinction hinges on the insight that
culpability tracks an actor’s mental state—a particular application of the
general thesis in ethics and law that culpability relates to an agent’s state
of mind and not merely to the physical consequences of action. Through
cognitional-affective inclinations, a person constitutes and designates
specific effects as affirmatively and subjectively willed to come to be.
Because a unique causal relation exists between the mental state of
“intention” and its effects, a unique personal responsibility is constituted.
Intended objects are identified and causally tied to the psychic state of an
actor in a manner that is not true of merely foreseen but unintended effects.128
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What is the relation between evil and intention, or aiming, that makes them clash
with such force?
The answer emerges if we ask ourselves what it is to aim at something, what
differentiates it from merely producing the result knowingly.
The difference is that action intentionally aimed at a goal is guided by that
goal. Whether the goal is an end in itself or only a means, action aimed at it must
follow it and be prepared to adjust its pursuit if deflected by altered
circumstances—whereas an act that merely produces an effect does not follow it,
is not guided by it, even if the effect is foreseen.
What does this mean? It means that to aim at evil, even as a means, is to have
one’s action guided by evil.
NAGEL, supra note 118, at 181.
129. This Article offers no endorsement of any of these individual attempts to apply double
effect. Rather, citation to them is made solely to provide some indication of the contemporary
widespread recognition and acceptance of the principle.
130. See, e.g., William Cooney, Affirmative Action and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 6 J.
APPLIED PHIL. 201, 201 (1989).
131. See, e.g., Gary Chartier, Comment, Natural Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and the Politics
of Virtue, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1593, 1622-30 (2001).
132. See, e.g., Laura Ferguson et al., Syringe Exchange in Pennsylvania: A Legal Analysis,
8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 41, 51-53 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Heather Johnson Kukla, Note, Embryonic Stem Cell Research: An Ethical
Justification, 90 GEO. L.J. 503, 537-39 (2002).
134. See, e.g., Clifford Longley, The Moral Issue That Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Catholic:
People Are Needlessly Dying of AIDS Because the Church Cannot Admit It Is Wrong About
Condoms, INDEPENDENT (London), July 16, 2000, at 24.
135. Donald B. Marquis, Four Versions of Double Effect, in THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE
EFFECT: PHILOSOPHERS DEBATE A CONTROVERSIAL MORAL PRINCIPLE, supra note 32, at 156, 163-
70.
136. RICH, supra note 7, at 142.
Although explicit discussion of double effect for a significant period
of time was limited primarily to Catholic circles, this is no longer the case.
As illustrated by Nagel’s and Foot’s discussions, the principle has gained
wide acceptance in secular thought. No doubt the principle is appealing
precisely because of its elasticity in dealing with complex moral situations
where agents, though attempting to intentionally bring about good effects,
cannot do so without causing foreseen bad results. Attempted applications
of the principle of double effect129 have been carried out with respect to
numerous contemporary ethical issues including, among others,
affirmative action,130 same-sex unions,131 syringe exchange programs,132
use of stem cells in medical research,133 use of condoms to prevent HIV
infection,134 and craniotomies to save the life of the mother.135
This widespread acceptance of the principle and the attempt to apply
it in numerous ethical contexts rebuts any assertion that double effect “has
been either ignored or severely criticized in the philosophical literature.”136
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137. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS (Alan Ryan ed.,
Penguin Books 1987) (1861) (providing the philosophical foundations of utilitarian thought).
138. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York stated:
While “up to the twelfth century the conception of mens rea in anything like its
modern sense was non-existent,” [Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L.
REV. 974, 981 (1932)], it should be remembered that the very nature of most
offenses rendered them unlikely or impossible of commission without some level
of intent and that state of mind “seems to have been a material factor, even from
the very earliest of times, in determining the extent of punishment.” Id.
Toward the end of the Middle Ages, the modern focus on the criminal’s state
of mind gradually began to evolve. “[T]he history of the recognition of culpable
The preceding discussions confirm instead that double effect offers first,
a lucid rationale for distinguishing intended ends from merely foreseen
effects and second, a basis for explaining why it is wrong to intend evil as
a means even if the same foreseen harm may be permitted as a side effect.
In so doing, the principle provides a resolution between two
exaggerated approaches to human conduct: an overly scrupulous
application of ethical norms and a reductionist utilitarianism. Double
effect recognizes that the mutability of the world produces situations
where apparently legitimate options for choice of certain goods include the
bringing about of foreseen but unintended harms. Overly ideological and
impractical applications of moral norms would prohibit action in all such
circumstances and arguably create unbearably restrictive burdens.
Utilitarianism, on the other hand, rejects commonly accepted moral norms
by claiming that morality has more to do with objective evaluations of
states of external affairs than intentions and states of mind of actors with
respect to their individual actions and their direct consequences.137
By marking out the distinctive moral import of “intention” as the
correct and fundamental starting point for attribution of personal
responsibility, double effect is able to present a way out of this dilemma.
It offers a solution that respects the existence of absolute ethical norms
applicable to individual actions and yet, at the same time, acknowledges
that at times such norms are not violated even if one’s conduct
foreseeably, but unintentionally, causes harms that those norms seek to
prevent.
III.  DOUBLE EFFECT AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.  Legal “Intent” and Double Effect
A jurisprudential premise inspiring much of American law—drawing
upon English common law and classical roots—is that an actor’s mental
state or “state of mind” determines, in important respects, the culpability
and punishment that should be meted out for particular actions.138 This
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states of mind should be viewed as a continuing process of self-civilization.” Paul
H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
[HASTINGS L.J.] 815, 850 (1980) (describing evolution of culpability distinctions
from ninth century to present). By the end of the twelfth century, the Roman law,
with its concept of culpa, and the canon law, with it [sic] emphasis on moral guilt,
began to influence the development of doctrines of culpability. [Sayre, supra, at
982-83].
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 490-91 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
139. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, for example, did not
deny that criminal liability, as well as civil, is founded on blameworthiness. Such
a denial would shock the moral sense of any civilized community; or, to put it
another way, a law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in
the average member of the community would be too severe for that community
to bear.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 42 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Little, Brown & Co.
1963) (1881). Relying on such statements, two legal scholars summarize the function of the mens
rea requirements as follows:
Although strict liability might provide a more effective deterrent to misconduct,
justice is offended by the imposition of sanctions where there is no moral
culpability. . . . The reason that different degrees of mental culpability result in
different sanctions is not for deterrent value, but because our tradition of justice
demands that we attempt to achieve proportionality between the moral
blameworthiness of the defendant and the sanction for his wrong.
Sean E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value of the Law in Shaping Social Perspectives on
Marriage, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 23, 27 (2001).
reflects a traditional view that it is not merely the physical causing of an
effect that constitutes the basis for culpability. Rather, legal culpability
depends upon a unique causal relation between an actor’s specific mental
state and occurrences in the world.139
As shown in Part II, double effect in many respects is based upon a
similar premise. Double effect dictates that ethical judgments about
particular actions depend upon the satisfaction of a number of conditions
relating to one’s mental state and its connection to particular effects of
conduct. Accordingly, in determining whether critics of Quill are correct
in asserting that application of double effect has no precedent in the law,
it is appropriate to consider the legal “state of mind” conditions for
determinations of culpability in a variety of areas of substantive
constitutional law and to explore whether similarities exist between these
conceptions and double effect.
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140. Shepard v. Circuit Court for Outgamie County, 525 N.W.2d 764, 767 (Wis. Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Gouger v. Hardtke, 482 N.W.2d 84, 88 (Wis. 1992) (quoting Pachucki v. Republic
Ins. Co., 278 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Wis. 1979))). “As the probability of injury to another, apparent
from the facts within the acting party’s knowledge, becomes greater, his conduct takes on more of
the attributes of intent, until it approaches and finally becomes indistinguishable from that
substantial certainty of harm that underlies intent.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 169-70 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); accord 57A AM. JUR.
2D Negligence § 30 (2004).
141. Gary Franklin explains:
Insistance [sic] upon discrete objective standards may be unrealistic and
impracticable; the distinctions often dissolve upon application. The Second
Restatement of Torts divides culpable states of mind into three strata: intent,
recklessness, and negligence. Each of these strata subjects an actor to a different
degree of liability. In practice, however, these three standards are not distinct at
all, but rather shade into one another to comprise a continuum of culpability. A
single act may subject an actor to any of the three levels of liability for the
consequences of his act. The determinative factors are the extent of the risk of
harm and the actor’s knowledge of the extent of the risk. Thus, an actor who
believes that particular consequences are “substantially certain” to result from his
act is held to the highest level of culpability, that of intent, whereas knowledge of
a “strong probability” subjects the actor to a lower level of culpability,
recklessness. Similarly, as the probability of harm decreases further, the conduct
approaches the lowest level of culpability, negligence.
Gary S. Franklin, Case Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart
1.  Increasing Foreseeability and Culpability
One possible explanation for rejection of double effect, both
philosophically and as applied in legal analysis, can be found in an overly
simplistic view of what properly accounts for varying types of culpability.
Often in legal discussions, infelicitous statements can be found proposing
that culpability for negligent, reckless, and intentional conduct differs
based on the relative foreseeability of harm:
The legal definition of “intentional” is essentially the same,
whether found in tort law or in criminal law . . . . “The
principal difference between negligent and intentional
conduct is ‘the difference in the probability, under the
circumstance known to the actor and according to common
experience, that a certain consequence or class of
consequences will follow from a certain act.’”140
According to this view, as one proceeds from simple negligence, to gross
negligence, to recklessness, to willful indifference, to knowledge (the
quintessential form of foreseeability), culpability increases in direct
proportion to the increasing certainty of harm.141 The implication of this
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out of “Smart Money,” 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 991-93 (1986) (footnote call numbers omitted).
142. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY 19 (1964);
Jonathan Simon, Ghosts of the Disciplinary Machine: Lee Harvey Oswald, Life-History, and the
Truth of Crime, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 75, 75-76 (1998) (“The Commission’s most famous
conclusion, that Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, shot and killed President John F. Kennedy, has
been the subject of ceaseless public debate.”) (footnote call number omitted).
143. See, e.g., EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, INQUEST: THE WARREN COMMISSION AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUTH 140-45 (1966) (describing both the difficulty weapons experts have in
firing the same rifle at the same rate as Oswald and Oswald’s poor marksmanship in the military).
144.  LaFave offers a similar example:
[I]f A shoots B at such a distance that his chances of hitting and killing him are
small, but with the desire of killing him, he intends to kill him; and if by good
luck the bullet hits B in a vital spot, A will be held to have intended to kill B,
sufficient for guilt of murder of the intent-to-kill variety.
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(a), at 341 (2d ed. 2003) (citing Studstill
v. State, 7 Ga. 2 (1849)).
interpretation is that nothing unique separates intentional misconduct from
other types of wrongdoing. Intentional action is wrong just because it has
more of the same thing that makes other forms of conduct wrong—greater
foreseeability of harm.
This understanding of the distinction between different types of legal
culpability, however, oversimplifies the law and thus misstates it. The law
does not, in fact, always regard conduct as more culpable because harm is
more foreseeable. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Lee Harvey
Oswald acted alone in intentionally shooting President Kennedy,142 and
assuming that the likelihood of his having struck the President was
remote,143 it is not true that Oswald would therefore be less culpable than
a secret service agent who, for the sake of argument, could have caused
similar harm to the President by negligently discharging a service
revolver. Oswald’s intentional conduct would be more culpable even if the
harm risked by his conduct was less probable than the same harm risked
by a secret service agent’s negligent conduct. This example disproves the
thesis that greater causal probability of a harm occurring primarily
distinguishes the culpability of intentional conduct from negligent
conduct.144
This argument, of course, does not deny that increasing foreseeability
of harm does sometimes justify increased culpability. After it is
established that some harm is unreasonable and unlawful at a specified
level of risk, increased foreseeability naturally compounds fault. In cases
of purposefully intended harm, however, as in the Kennedy assassination,
courts adjudicate culpability using a more fundamental set of ethical and
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145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). Here “desire” cannot refer simply to an
ephemeral emotional state but refers generally to any affirmatively specified object of a volitional
inclination.
146. LaFave stated:
[T]he traditional view is that a person who acts (or omits to act) intends a result
of his act (or omission) under two quite different circumstances: (1) when he
consciously desires that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening
from his conduct; and (2) when he knows that that result is practically certain to
follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result.
1 LAFAVE, supra note 144, § 5.2(a), at 341 (emphasis added).
147. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
legal criteria not captured by the notion of culpability based on mere
probability of harm.
2.  Intent: Desire and “Substantial Certainty”
Other statements of the law provide “thicker” conceptions of intention
and confirm this preceding critique. Any modern law student, for example,
is familiar with the Restatement (Second) of Torts’s definition of intent:
“The word ‘intent’ is used . . . to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.”145 This definition, applicable in
diverse areas of substantive law beyond tort law, captures two distinct
instances in which conduct may for legal purposes be considered
“intentional”—when a particular result is “desired” or when a particular
result is foreseen with “substantial certainty” to follow from one’s
conduct.146
Relying precisely on this two-fold definition of intent, opponents of
double effect challenge an attempt to claim, as the Court did in Quill, that
a legal distinction exists between intending effects in the Restatement’s
sense of “desired” (e.g., physician-assisted suicide’s intent that the patient
“be made dead”) and causing effects with “substantial certainty” though
not “desired” (e.g., the causing of foreseeable death by withholding life
support or palliative care).147 Opponents of double effect believe that
definitions of intent like those in the Restatement confirm that foreseen,
substantially certain results are intended, and unproblematically embody
the legal view that a person intends the natural and probable consequences
of his or her acts.148
The commentary of the Restatement itself, however, disproves that
argument:
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149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b.
150. Id. (emphasis added).
151. “The difference between a negligent act and an intentional act such as the crime of rape
or assault lies in the mental state of the actor. ‘This different-in-kind argument is rooted in the
moral culpability involved in intentional acts, which is objectively absent from the mind of a
negligent actor.’” Stellas v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 673 So. 2d 940, 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)
(quoting B. Scott Andrews, Comment, Premises Liability—The Comparison of Fault Between
Negligent and Intentional Actors, 55 LA. L. REV. 1149, 1159 (1995)).
All consequences which the actor desires to bring about
are intended . . . . Intent is not, however, limited to 
consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the
consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result
from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as
if he had in fact desired to produce the result.149
Despite what one might infer upon a superficial reading of this passage,
careful consideration of its content reveals that the exemplar notion of
intent envisioned by the Restatement drafters depends upon effects that the
actor desires to bring about. An actor’s intention, taken in this sense, is
coextensive only with consequences of conduct that the actor brings about
because of specific desires for those consequences. Only after securely
fixing this paradigmatic conception of intent are the drafters able to extend
its scope. As the commentary continues, if a person foresees that some
consequence is “certain, or substantially certain, to result,” that conduct
can be regarded as intentional only because the actor “is treated by the law
as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”150
In extending the meaning of intent to objects not desired but merely
foreseen, the drafters openly concede that the law imposes a fiction. More
clearly than any other argument offered by proponents of double effect to
rebut claims that no distinction exists between intent as “desire” and intent
as “substantial certainty,” the Restatement’s “treating” of substantial
certainty “as if” it were desire confirms that the two acts are, at least
functionally, distinct and that intention as desire constitutes the primary
meaning of intent.
While it remains to consider why the Restatement may treat knowledge
with substantial certainty “as if” it were actual intent, this analysis
confirms, at least theoretically, the model of intentional action applied in
ethical contexts described in Part II. Intentional action in its paradigmatic
form constitutes a distinct form of human conduct151 where responsibility
is primarily determined, not by an evaluation of the degree of probability
that one’s conduct will cause a given harm, but based on an affirmative
psychological connection between the awareness and desires of the actor
and the effects specified by those thoughts and desires.
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152. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“[T]he jury is entitled to presume that a person intends the natural and
probable consequences of his acts.”); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 514 n.19
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he law presumes that one intends the natural and probable
consequences of one’s actions or inactions.”); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 570 n.22 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) (“Indeed, perhaps the oldest rule of
evidence—that a man is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts—is
based on the common law’s preference for objectively measurable data over subjective statements
of opinion and intent.”).
This functional distinction recognized by the Restatement confirms the
basic distinction made between intended and merely foreseen
consequences in double effect. Although it remains to be seen whether this
functional distinction acknowledged in the Restatement is given effect in
the law, the theoretical recognition of the distinction by the Restatement
clearly supports double effect’s claim that a logical opening is created that
may permit, under certain circumstances, unintentionally causing foreseen
harms that would be prohibited if purposely brought about.
3.  “Substantial Certainty” as Intent
Presumably, some justification explains the Restatement’s fiction that
an actor who merely foresees a substantially certain result be treated “as
if he had in fact desired to produce the result.”152 Examination of such
justifications may, in turn, prove helpful for determining if and when
imposition of such a fiction may not be appropriate—if, as double effect
proposes, there are circumstances in which a person is not legally culpable
for causing unintended harm, even when foreseen with substantial
certainty.
a.  Evidentiary Presumption of Intent from Consequences
Undoubtedly, one factor justifying the fiction of substantial certainty
as “intent” is its evidentiary value. Actors’ intentions are not always
simple matters to discern in law or otherwise. Defendants, if not
deliberately concealing or misrepresenting their prior intentions, often
rationalize or fail to accurately recall them. Further, defendants may be
indisposed because of sickness or death or otherwise be unavailable or
simply refuse to testify as to their actual intent. In view of these
difficulties, juries are sometimes permitted to presume the intent or desire
of an actor based on the “natural and probable” consequences of the
actor’s actions (of which effects foreseeable with substantial certainty
qualify par excellence).153 On this ground, the Restatement fiction makes
2005] IN INCOGNITO— THE PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 515
154. “[H]is thoughts must be gathered from his words (if any) and actions in the light of all
the surrounding circumstances. Naturally, what he does and what foreseeably results from his deeds
have a bearing on what he may have had in his mind.” 1 LAFAVE , supra note 144, § 5.2(f), at 357.
155. The distinction between the two is clearly reflected in one court’s justification of the
presumption rule:
[T]his fiction is grounded upon sound policy, for, as outlined above, a rule
focusing on foreseeable, rather than intended, consequences operates in sensible
and fair fashion to deter the conduct sought to be avoided and to punish those
whose actions are blameworthy, even though undertaken for purposes that may
or may not be culpable.
United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1979). If it proves true, however, that
some acts are unlawful only if they are shown to have a culpable purpose, the automatic operation
of the fiction would in fact be improper. See infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
156. For an analysis of the operation of double effect in negligence law—an analysis that
supports and corroborates application of the principle in the context of the legal analysis of
intentional constitutional conduct addressed in the present Article—see Edward C. Lyons,
Balancing Acts: Intending Good and Foreseeing Harm—the Principle of Double Effect in the Law
of Negligence, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2005).
sense precisely because evidence of what was foreseeable often tends to
prove what the actor actually desired to bring about.154
This interpretation of the fiction, however, offers little help for
theoretical opposition to double effect. If the substantial certainty test of
intent is warranted only because of its value in establishing the actual
“desired” intent of the actor, it actually confirms the distinction between
intent and mere foreknowledge.155 While it may be the case in tort law that
a conclusive legal presumption of intent exists based on evidence of the
foreseen natural and probable consequences of one’s action, it would be
a logical fallacy to conclude either that the two are equivalent in reality or,
without further argument, that such a conclusive presumption applies in
all legal contexts.
b.  Increased Foreseeability of Harm and Intent
The evidentiary usefulness of the substantial certainty test of intent is,
however, not the only justification that supports its adoption as a criterion
of liability. As the very notion of the law of negligence provides, a person
can be culpable for bringing about foreseeable harmful effects precisely
when the person does not intend such effects.156 Applying a similar
criterion of liability to situations in which unlawful harms are foreseen
with substantial certainty though not intended, it appears appropriate to
impose greater liability. Culpability exists a fortiori because the actor
foresees with even more certainty that some unlawful harm will be the
result.
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157. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
158. Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 417, 418 (1987).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 286.
162. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 801-02 (1997).
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added).
164. Quill, 521 U.S. at 802-03 (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
Similar to the philosophical “package deal” argument considered in
Part II,157 Glanville Williams noted that “one type of case in which it is
reasonable to say that an undesired consequence can be intended in law is
in respect of known certainties.”158 Williams provides the example of the
pain and discomfort associated with a dental visit.159 Williams states that
although the actor does not desire the pain in itself, “[i]t is accepted not as
an end in itself but as part of the package, and the package as a whole is
desired—otherwise one would not go to the dentist.”160 Here, Williams
merely restates his view, articulated years earlier, that “[w]hen a result is
foreseen as certain, it is the same as if it were desired or intended.”161
The attempt to collapse intent as purpose and intent as “substantial
certainty” under a legal version of the “package deal” theory is, however,
subject to two significant deficiencies. First, the Restatement’s treatment
of substantial certainty “as if” it were actual intent creates an onus to
explain why the two cases should be treated the same. Reiterating that
consequences are intentional because they follow conduct with substantial
certainty merely restates the question. The propriety of treating such
consequences as intentional is the very point at issue. Secondly, the
“package deal” argument assumes that the law, in fact, always treats
purposeful causing of harm the same as it treats causing foreseen but
undesired harm—the very thesis denied by the Supreme Court in Quill.162
Ultimately, then, any final evaluation of the proper scope and
justification for treating “substantial certainty” as a de jure proxy for
actual intent requires investigation of whether any contrary instances exist
in the law—whether instances can be found in the law when actors are not
held liable for consequences that are foreseen with substantial certainty.
If such instances exist, they may provide insight into the justification for
when it is not appropriate to treat an actor “as if he had in fact desired to
produce the result”163 and, more importantly, confirm a place for double
effect analysis in the law.
B.  Intent as “Purpose”—Vacco v. Quill
This inquiry turns discussion directly to consideration of Quill’s claim
that “the law distinguishes actions taken ‘because of’ a given end from
actions taken ‘in spite of’ their unintended but foreseen consequences”164
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165. Id. at 801.
166. RICH, supra note 7, at 142; see supra text accompanying note 7.
167. Quill, 521 U.S. at 802-03.
168. Id.
169. 342 U.S. 246 (1952), cited in Quill, 521 U.S. at 802.
170. Id. at 247-48, 260.
171. Id. at 250-63.
172. Id. at 262-63.
173. Id. at 264. The Court stated:
Congress has been alert to what often is a decisive function of some mental
element in crime. It has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described
variously in one or more such terms as “intentional,” “willful,” “knowing,”
“fraudulent” or “malicious,” will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act, or
and its further claim that such a distinction “comports with fundamental
legal principles of causation and intent.”165 Although the opinion, as noted
in the introduction to this Article, has been criticized for offering “precious
little argumentation or analysis”166 for its reliance on double effect, it
cannot be said to have offered no justification. In support of its claim, the
Court cited a number of cases, in differing substantive legal contexts, that
clearly distinguish between an actor causing an effect purposefully as
opposed to causing that same effect with substantial certainty.167
1.  Criminal Law
The Court offers a defense of its reliance on the double effect
intended/foreseen distinction first by citing cases in the constitutional
criminal law context that consider various forms of culpable mental states
of mind or mens rea required to convict actors of criminal violations.168
a.  Morissette v. United States169
In Morissette, the Court was called upon to determine whether a federal
statute prohibiting theft of government property required only proof that
the actor voluntarily took property that did not belong to him or, more
specifically, required proof that the actor knew the property belonged to
the government.170 Rejecting the position that no specific knowledge or
purposeful intent was required, the Court engaged in a lengthy
consideration of the common law’s requirement of proof of mens rea.171
The Court concluded that Congress would not have eliminated all mens
rea requirements in codifying a common law crime without indicating that
it meant to do so.172
Examining the particular mental state required for conviction under the
statute before it, the Court observed that Congress employs a variety of
mental state distinctions.173 In the course of this analysis, the Court
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increase the degree of the offense or its punishment.
Id. (footnote call number omitted).
174. Id. at 270.
175. Id. at 264-65.
176. Id. at 265 & n.27 (citing Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945)).
177. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1).
178. Id. at 29.
179. Cramer offers the example of an actor aiding the enemy by engaging in conduct for the
purpose of “profiteering.” Id. “Profiteering” is defined as “The taking advantage of unusual or
exceptional circumstances to make excessive profits . . . during war.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1247 (8th ed. 2004).
180. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 275.
181. Id. at 249.
expressly recognized that “[k]nowledge . . . is not identical with intent.”174
Although the Court concluded that the statute at issue only required proof
of “knowledge” that the property belonged to the United States for
conviction, the Court observed that Congress sometimes “required a
specific intent or purpose.”175
As an example of such a requirement, the Morissette Court referred to
its holding in Cramer v. United States,176 where it interpreted the
Constitution’s requirement that “[t]reason against the United States, shall
consist . . . in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”177
In Cramer, the Court had held that conviction for treason requires not only
proof of acts that knowingly aid and comfort the enemy but also a finding
that the accused had the specific intent of siding with, or “adhering” to, the
foreign country by means of such acts—“if there is no adherence to the
enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no treason.”178 If an
actor simply were aware that conduct had the consequence of aiding and
comforting the enemy, but had no purpose of betraying the United
States,179 conviction for treason would be improper.
Following this citation to Cramer as illustrating a specific intent crime,
the Court in Morissette turned its attention to a related evidentiary issue
concerning whether a jury could presume an actor’s traitorous intent based
merely on the foreseeable consequences of the actor’s conduct.180 In
Morissette, the trial court had instructed the jury that the legal presumption
of the actor’s intent to steal or convert government property existed if it
were proven that the defendant voluntarily took the property in question.181
This issue, as already indicated, is important because the evidentiary
inference that can be drawn from proof of the “natural and probable
consequences” of conduct offers significant support for the Restatement’s
conclusive presumption that actors be treated “as if” they had actual
intent—especially when there is evidence that they were “substantially
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182. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
183. RICH, supra note 7, at 143; Rich also has stated:
[T]he law (the Supreme Court’s decisions in the physician-assisted suicide cases
to the contrary notwithstanding) has traditionally postulated the presumption that
every person of sound mind intends the natural and probable (i.e., foreseeable)
consequences of her actions. From that perspective, there is no principled moral
distinction between the consequences of one’s actions that are intended and those
that are merely foreseen.
Ben Rich, Double Effect and Medical Ethics, UC DAVIS MED., Spring 2004, at
http://www.ucdmc.ucdavis.edu/ucdavismedicine/alumni/ethics.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
Rich’s view, if correct, would not only disprove double effect but also undermine attempts to
rationally distinguish intentional and negligent conduct. If, as Rich asserts, no principled basis
exists for distinguishing between causing foreseeable natural and probable effects of conduct and
causing intended effects, many cases of negligently inflicted harm should be treated as intentional
harming. For further elaboration of this critique, see generally Lyons, supra note 156.
184. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 275.
certain” of the consequences.182 Some legal commentators argue that it is
this very presumption that undermines Quill’s attempt to assert that
anything like double effect can operate in the law. If the law posits a
presumption of intent from foreseen effects, any attempt to distinguish
intent from foreknowledge will be inappropriate. As one commentator
states:
[M]ost problematic from a legal perspective, . . . DDE [(the
doctrine of double effect)] accepts the proposition that the
bad effect may be foreseeable but nonetheless unintended.
The law, to the contrary, presumes that a person intends the
natural and probable consequences of his or her actions. . . .
Since intent is an essential element of many criminal
offenses, the prosecution’s burden of proof could never be
met unless such a presumption were in place.183
Expressly contradicting this assertion, however, Morissette and its
progeny unequivocally hold that, in many criminal law contexts, operation
of a mandatory presumption is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has
held that, in at least some criminal law contexts, an irrebutable
presumption of a defendant’s intent based on the natural and probable
consequences of his or her conduct conflicts with a defendant’s right to a
presumption of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt and thus interferes
with the right to a jury trial.184
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185. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
186. 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
187. Francis, 471 U.S. at 313; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522.
188. 442 U.S. at 513.
189. 471 U.S. at 309.
190. Francis, 471 U.S. at 313-18; Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521-24.
191. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978)).
192. Id. at 523-24. “[T]he fact-finder may (but need not) conclude under those circumstances
that A intended to kill B. . . . [T]he matter is reduced to an inference (or ‘permissive presumption’)
rather than a true presumption of the mandatory sort.” 1 LAFAVE, supra note 144, § 5.2(f), at 356.
In the later cases of Sandstrom v. Montana185 and Francis v.
Franklin,186 the Court, relying upon its holding in Morissette, further
developed its legal reflections upon presumptions of intent.187 In
Sandstrom, the jury was instructed that “‘[t]he law presumes that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts.’”188 In Francis,
the instruction was that “‘[a] person of sound mind and discretion is
presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts but
the presumption may be rebutted.’”189 Rejecting the constitutionality of
both jury instructions, the Court found that no mandatory presumption of
intent based on evidence of the natural and probable consequences of
conduct was proper, even if it merely created a presumption that shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant to rebut.190 In a comment especially
relevant for present purposes, the Court in Sandstrom observed, “[A]
defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal . . . offense
which . . . cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal
presumption of wrongful intent from proof of an effect.”191 Instead, the
Court found that only an instruction that informed the jury that it may
conclude or not under all the circumstances that evidence of the natural
and probable consequences of effects established actual intent was
constitutional.192
Morissette’s discussion of specific intent crimes with reference to
Cramer and its rejection of the constitutionality of conclusive, mandatory
presumptions based on “proof of an effect” disproves the claim of double
effect opponents that the law always regards an actor as intending the
“natural and probable consequences” of conduct. Moreover, that
discussion also rebuts the claim that the law allows no distinction to be
drawn between actors engaging in conduct purposefully and engaging in
conduct when effects are foreseen to follow with substantial certainty.
Instead, Morrissette and its related cases support the contrary
conclusions—that in certain contexts, the law allows for a distinction to be
made between what an actor intends and what an actor foresees and that
actual intent cannot always be presumed based on the foreseen “natural
and probable consequences” of conduct.
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193. 444 U.S. 394 (1980), cited in Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802 (1997).
194. Id. at 401.
195. Id. at 408.
196. Id. at 403 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW § 28, at 201-02 (1972)).
197. Section 2.02(1) provides in relevant part: “[A] person is not guilty of an offense unless
he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to
each material element of the offense.” MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1962).
The Foreword to the MPC lists thirty-four states that revised their criminal codes between 1962
and 1983. Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE (1962). Some scholars assert a smaller impact of the
MPC upon state law. See, e.g., Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s
Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing
the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 229, 236 (1997) (asserting that twenty-two states
had adopted the MPC’s basic culpability structure).
198. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403-06.
199. Id. at 404 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978)
(quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 196, at 196)). The MODEL PENAL CODE provides in relevant
part: 
(a) Purposely.
b.  United States v. Bailey193
In Bailey, another case cited in Quill supporting its reliance on double
effect analysis, the Court was presented with the following issue: whether
conviction for the crime of unlawfully escaping from federal custody
requires a purposeful intent to avoid confinement or simply proof of intent
to avoid inhumane conditions with the concomitant knowledge that fleeing
such conditions entails leaving federal confinement.194 Although the Court
eventually concluded that the statute required only that the defendant
“knew his actions would result in his leaving physical confinement
without permission,”195 the Court, expanding on its reasoning in
Morissette, again engaged in extended analysis of mens rea in criminal
law.
Rejecting analysis of the case under the traditional categories of
“specific intent” versus “general intent” because of ambiguities associated
with those terms in different contexts,196 the Court turned attention to the
American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code (MPC) section 2.02(1) for
articulation of the mental states required for culpability.197 The Court
focused particular attention upon the distinction drawn between an actor
engaging in conduct “purposely” and an actor engaging in conduct merely
“knowingly.”198 Summarizing this distinction, the Court in Bailey stated:
[A] person who causes a particular result is said to act
purposefully if “‘he consciously desires that result, whatever
the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct,’”
while he is said to act knowingly if he is aware “‘that that
result is practically certain to follow from his conduct,
whatever his desire may be as to that result.’”199
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A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when . . .
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a
result . . . .
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when . . . he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result.
§ 2.02(2).
200. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404 (quoting United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 445 (quoting
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 196, at 197)).
The Court in United States Gypsum Co. noted that, when a business engages in anticompetitive
behavior, the certainty of the consequences of which are clear to the perpetrator after having
expressly weighed the costs, benefits, and risks, there is no reason not to impose criminal liability
for producing effects the law prohibits. 438 U.S. at 445-46.
A requirement of proof not only of . . . knowledge of likely effects, but also of a
conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the law would seem . . .
both unnecessarily cumulative and unduly burdensome. Where carefully planned
and calculated conduct is being scrutinized in the context of a criminal
prosecution, the perpetrator’s knowledge of the anticipated consequences is a
sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal intent.
Id.
201. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404-05.
202. The Bailey Court cited its decision in Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405. In Haupt, the father of a German saboteur was tried for treason based on
allegations that he had provided his son with lodging and other aid and comfort. Haupt, 330 U.S.
at 632-33. In order to ascertain liability, the jury was instructed that if the “defendant’s intention
was not to injure the United States but merely to aid his son ‘as an individual, as distinguished from
assisting him in his purposes, if such existed, of aiding the German Reich, or of injuring the United
States, the defendant must be found not guilty.’” Id. at 641. Mere knowledge of the son’s unlawful
plans did not automatically transform otherwise normal fatherly actions into traitorous comfort and
aid. Id. The conviction was affirmed only because other evidence showed the father’s purposeful
approval of the son’s efforts to aid the enemy. Id. at 642.
203. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405.
In discussing these differing bases for imposing liability, the Court
observed that often a distinction between “purposely” and “knowingly” is
irrelevant because “‘there is good reason for imposing liability whether the
defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the
results.’”200 The Court went on to observe, however, that sometimes the
law does take account of the difference between purpose and
knowledge.201 Referring again to the law of treason taken up in
Morissette,202 the Court offered two additional legal contexts in which the
distinction between purpose and knowledge is relevant for imposing
liability in criminal law: 1) the inchoate criminal offenses of attempt and
conspiracy and 2) the law of homicide.203
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204. Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmts. (1962).
205. E.g., Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 681-82 & n.2, 689 (1944) (reversing a
defendant’s conviction for violation of Espionage Act of 1917 which prohibited the “attempt to
cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States”). The Court in Hartzel held that, although the defendant had circulated pamphlets
that might have had the effect of causing such results among draft-age persons, no attempt to
violate the Act could be found because no evidence permitted the inference beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had “a specific intent or evil purpose at the time of the alleged overt acts
to cause insubordination or disloyalty in the armed forces.” Id. at 686-87. LaFave cites this case to
support his claim that “there are several areas of the criminal law in which there may be good
reason for distinguishing between one’s objectives and knowledge.” 1 LAFAVE, supra note 144,
§ 5.2(b), at 342-43.
Many states adopt the MODEL PENAL CODE approach with respect to attempt, e.g.:
[O]ur State legislature manifested a desire to treat intent and knowledge as distinct
mental states when imposing criminal liability for conduct. Consequently, the
difference between intent and knowledge should not be treated as a metaphysical
distinction which can be ignored. Knowledge is not intent as defined by our
statutes . . . . Accordingly . . . in a prosecution for attempted murder . . . the
incompatible elements must be omitted from the jury instructions.
People v. Kraft, 478 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). “Knowledge that the consequences
of an accused’s act may result in death (or grave bodily injury) . . . is not enough; specific intent
to kill is required. Both the indictment and the instructions must unambiguously reflect this.”
People v. Jones, 405 N.E. 2d 343, 346 (Ill. 1980) (citation omitted).
The law of conspiracy is similar in many contexts. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-3-401(1)(A)
(Michie 2005) (“A person conspires to commit an offense if with the purpose of promoting or
facilitating the commission of any criminal offense . . . [h]e agrees with another person or other
persons [to] . . . engage in conduct that constitutes that offense . . . .”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 629:3(I) (2005) (“A person is guilty of conspiracy if, with a purpose that a crime defined by
statute be committed, he agrees with one or more persons to commit or cause the commission of
such crime . . . .”). As one court has construed such statutory languages:
[O]ne must have “the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of any
criminal offense.” This phrasing serves to exclude from the provision’s
application persons who engage in conduct that furthers the ends of a conspiracy,
but who have no purpose to do so. This is so even if the person knows his conduct
assists in the accomplishment of criminal objectives . . . .
In the crimes of attempt and conspiracy, the Court cited to the MPC’s
discussion providing that “in attempts, complicity and conspiracy . . . a
true purpose to effect the criminal result is requisite for liability.”204
Attempts or conspiracies to commit a crime require in many instances
more than mere knowledge that one’s actions might have the effect of
furthering or bringing about a particular result that is criminalized under
the law. Instead, conviction often requires proof that the actor purposely
intended that his conduct either bring about the unlawful result or further
the criminal enterprise.205
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Cate v. State, 606 S.W.2d 764, 766-67 (Ark. 1980).
206. 444 U.S. at 405.
207. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 144, § 14.2(a), at 429. Colorado, for example, like numerous other
states, defines the degrees of murder and distinguishes punishment precisely on the basis of purpose
versus knowledge. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-102 (West 2005). Section 18-3-102 provides:
“A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if . . . [a]fter deliberation and with the
intent to cause the death of a person other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of
another person.” Id. § 18-3-102(1)(a). Section 18-3-103 provides: “A person commits the crime of
murder in the second degree if the person knowingly causes the death of a person.” Id. § 18-3-
103(1). First degree murder is punishable by life imprisonment or death with no possibility of
parole, while second degree murder is punishable by eight to twenty-four years imprisonment with
parole possible after five years. Id. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-10-
102, 5-10-103, 5-4-401 (Michie 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1-a, 630:1-b (2005); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-202, 39-13-210, 40-35-111 (2005).
The Bailey Court noted that in the law of homicide, statutory or
common law “often distinguishes, either in setting the ‘degree’ of the
crime [homicide] or in imposing punishment, between a person who
knows that another person will be killed as the result of his conduct and a
person who acts with the specific purpose of taking another’s life.”206
Apart from any discussion of killing another in contexts involving self-
defense—where clearly defensive intentions of the actor play a significant
role—purposeful homicide is consistently punished more severely than
conduct merely foreseen to have as a consequence the death of another. As
Wayne LaFave observes, “a majority [of jurisdictions] . . . classify
intentional and knowing killings differently.”207
Careful examination of the import of Quill’s references to Morissette
and Bailey, and their related cases, establishes that in restricted but
significant instances the law distinguishes between an actor purposely
intending an effect and an actor foreseeing that effect with substantial
certainty as the “natural and probable consequence” of his conduct.
Considering those cases requiring a specific purpose over and above mere
knowledge, one significant reason justifying this requirement appears to
be that the criminal prohibition at issue is aimed not just at preventing
some objective harm, but precisely at punishing a certain type of
subjective human conduct, conduct that is purposefully aimed at that
unlawful result. Considering the examples of treason, attempt, conspiracy,
and homicide, it is not unreasonable to infer that a unique degree of
culpability is and should be imposed when the actor purposefully sets out
to engage in wrongdoing that causes those harms. As the drafters of the
MPC observe:
[A]ction is not purposive . . . unless it was his conscious
object to perform an action of that nature or to cause such a
result. It is meaningful to think of the actor’s attitude as
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208. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 2 at 233.
209. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
210. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1997) (quoting Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (1979)).
211. 442 U.S. at 259.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 273, 281.
214. Id. at 272 (“When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven effects upon
particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional concern.”).
215. Id.
216. Id. (emphasis added). “Certain classifications . . . in themselves supply a reason to infer
antipathy. . . . This rule applies as well to a classification that is ostensibly neutral but is an obvious
pretext for racial discrimination.” Id.
217. Id. at 273 (citing 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
different if he is simply aware that  . . . the prohibited result
is practically certain to follow from his conduct.208
2.  Constitutional Equal Protection Law
The Quill Court’s additional reliance on Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney209 to support its double effect analysis
corroborates these points. It is from Feeney that the Court draws its
explicit statement that “the law distinguishes actions taken ‘because of’ a
given end from actions taken ‘in spite of’ their unintended but foreseen
consequences.”210
In Feeney, a female plaintiff brought an action alleging that a
Massachusetts statute extending a preference for veterans in civil service
hiring violated her rights under the Equal Protection Clause.211 The
preference for veterans overwhelmingly operated in favor of male
applicants.212 Rejecting the plaintiff’s claim, the Court observed that the
Equal Protection Clause “guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”213
The Court went on to explain that no constitutional violation occurs
when a rational law, neutral on its face, happens to have a disproportionate
impact on one segment of the population.214 The Court stated that
correcting for any such effects is the province of legislatures: “The
calculus of effects, the manner in which a particular law reverberates in a
society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.”215 The Court
further stated that even when purportedly neutral laws have a
“disproportionately adverse effect” upon a specially protected class, such
as a specific gender or race, violation of equal protection exists “only if
that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”216
In support of this assertion, the Feeney Court cited to Washington v.
Davis.217 In Davis, Caucasians passed a mandatory governmental
employment test in significantly greater numbers than African-
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218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 275. “Veteran status is not uniquely male. Although few women benefit from the
preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the contrary, significant numbers
of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans—male as well as female—are placed at a
disadvantage.” Id.
221. Id. at 278.
222. Id. (quoting Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 151 (D. Mass. 1978) (Campbell,
J., concurring)). As one commentator has summarized the foreseeability of the damages: “Not only
was the adverse impact on women ‘severe,’ it was also fully foreseeable prior to adoption of the
policy and crystal clear during its years of operation.” Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and
Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943,
976-77 (1984) (footnote call number omitted).
223. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 278.
224. Id. at 278-79. “The decision to grant a preference to veterans was of course ‘intentional.’
So, necessarily, did an adverse impact upon nonveterans follow from that decision. . . . It would
thus be disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for women were
Americans.218 A race-based equal protection challenge to the exam was
rejected on the ground that “there had been no showing that racial
discrimination entered into the establishment or formulation of the test.”219
Applying this standard for liability, the Court in Feeney found that,
although the preference did favor males disproportionately in its effect, it
was neutral on its face because it disadvantaged all nonveterans, male or
female.220 In attempting to establish a discriminatory purpose behind this
purportedly neutral policy, however, the plaintiff argued that proof of the
legislature’s discriminatory intent could be based on “the presumption . . .
that a person intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
voluntary actions.”221 The plaintiff argued:
[T]here is no reason to absolve the legislature from awareness
that the means chosen to achieve this goal would freeze
women out of all those state jobs actively sought by men. . . .
[T]he cutting-off of women’s opportunities was an inevitable
concomitant of the chosen scheme—as inevitable as the
proposition that if tails is up, heads must be down. Where a
law’s consequences are that inevitable, can they meaningfully
be described as unintended?222
Responding to the plaintiff’s question of whether such inevitably
foreseeable discrimination could be described as “unintended,” the Court
stated that the “rhetorical question implies that a negative answer is
obvious, but it is not.”223 Instead, the Court carefully distinguished the
meaning of “intent” as “purpose” from its broader, less precise meaning
that also encompassed mere acceptance of foreseen adverse consequences
of conduct.224 The Court stated, “‘Discriminatory purpose,’ however,
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unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they were not foreseeable.”
Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 279.
226. See id. at 279, 281.
227. Id. at 279 n.25. Although the Court rejected proof of intent based on merely the certainty
of the foreseen consequences, this does not deny that sometimes a discriminatory purpose can be
inferred from circumstantial evidence. One particularly important factor will be whether the
defendant can offer evidence of an alternative, legitimate interest served by the decision and the
unavailability of less discriminatory alternatives. Cf. Brodin, supra note 222, at 976 (listing the
relevant factors for proof of discrimination). Apparently, the plaintiff in Feeney failed to offer such
evidence. See 442 U.S. at 274-75.
228. Courts continue to regularly cite Feeney in cases finding that an unintentional disparate
impact upon certain classes of persons is constitutional. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cornejo, 355 F.3d
1021, 1024 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a claim that a higher rate of airport searches of African-
American women than some other groups denoted racial discrimination and stating that “searches
designed to catch smugglers comport with the Constitution even if they produce a disparate
impact”); United States v. Moore, 54 F.3d 92, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1995) (rejecting a claim that a
sentencing ratio equating one hundred grams of cocaine to one gram of crack constitutes
discrimination against African-Americans because “Congress had a valid reason for mandating
implies more . . . . It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”225
Because the plaintiff in Feeney offered no evidence that the legislature
enacted the preference “because of” a purpose to discriminate against
women instead of merely “in spite of” that foreseen, arguably inevitable
consequence, the Court found no violation of equal protection.226
Illustrating how a permissive rather than mandatory presumption of intent
properly operates in such a situation, the Court explained:
[W]hen the adverse consequences of a law upon an
identifiable group are . . . inevitable . . . a strong inference
that the adverse effects were desired can reasonably be
drawn. But in this inquiry—made as it is under the
Constitution—an inference is a working tool, not a synonym
for proof. . . . [H]ere, the inference simply fails to ripen into
proof.227
Feeney, like the other cases cited by the Supreme Court in Quill,
supports the view that double effect analysis is clearly present in the law.
Although governmental conduct may have inevitable and foreseeable
consequences—even involving disproportionate effects on constitutionally
protected classes—as long as a rational nondiscriminatory purpose
justifies such action, the law finds nothing impermissible or
unconstitutional in the conduct.228
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harsher penalties for crack as opposed to powder cocaine: the greater accessibility and
addictiveness of crack”) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1994)); Jones
v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 737 F.2d 996, 1004 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim of African-American
applicants that bar rules forbidding applicants to the bar from taking the bar exam more than five
times were discriminatory and noting that the applicants “make no charge that [the Board of
Commissioners] adopted the five-time rule even in part because of its discriminatory impact on
blacks.”); Soberal-Perez v. Heckler, 717 F.2d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the claim of Hispanic
plaintiffs that the failure of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide forms and
services in Spanish constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and stating that “[i]t is
not difficult for us to understand why the Secretary decided that forms should be printed and oral
instructions given in the English language: English is the national language of the United States”).
Feeney also confirms the view that what is at play in statutes
distinguishing purpose from mere knowledge is precisely the effort to
isolate for punishment the greater culpability associated with actual intent.
In limiting or increasing liability for purposeful acts, legislatures
presumably seek to impose greater punishment and deterrence upon acts
that involve especially egregious “attitudes” or “desires” of the actors. In
such cases, these interior dispositions or “purposes” are considered wrong
in addition to the “objective” harm brought about by such conduct. As
evidenced by the equal protection claims asserted in Davis and Feeney, the
constitutional prohibition against discrimination appears aimed not so
much at eradicating racial and gender distinctions wherever found and
however caused, but rather primarily at prohibiting such discrimination
when it results from a specific mental state: purposeful discrimination.
3.  Synopsis
Quill’s reliance on Morissette, Bailey, Feeney, and their related cases
substantiates the Court’s claim that a legitimate legal distinction can be
drawn between types of conduct distinguished only by the mental state of the
actor. While such a distinction is not recognized by the law in all contexts,
the law will sometimes treat actions that purposely have an unlawful effect
as their intended goal in a way different from the way that it treats actions
foreseen but not intended to bring about that same effect. As discussed above,
the driving force behind such a distinction is found in the view that sometimes
law is concerned not merely with punishing an actor for the effects of conduct
but with punishing a unique type of subjective culpability—that associated
with an actor’s purposeful intent.
C.  Intent as “Purpose”—Applicability in Other Areas
of Constitutional Law
Before turning to consider application of double effect in Quill directly,
it is important to note that corroboration of Quill’s basic insight regarding the
law’s recognition of a distinction between intent and knowledge is reflected
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229. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The plaintiffs, members of the Native American Church whose
religious practices included use of peyote, were denied state unemployment compensation based
on their work-related “misconduct” of peyote ingestion—conduct constituting a felony in the State
of Oregon. Id. at 874; see OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (2005); OR. ADMIN. R. 855-080-0021(3)(v)
(2005).
230. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79. In its opinion, the majority asserted that over one hundred
years of free exercise jurisprudence contradicted any proposition that asserted that “an individual’s
religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate.” Id.
231. Id. at 878.
232. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
233. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886 n.3.
in other areas of constitutional law not cited by Quill. In order to corroborate
Quill’s holding and to highlight the operation of double effect in other legal
contexts, the following section shall consider additional examples in
constitutional law where a distinction is drawn between intent and
knowledge.
1.  First Amendment Law
In the context of free exercise, establishment, and free speech claims,
clear distinctions are drawn in the law between the intention of
governmental action and incidental but foreseen effects caused by such
action.  In each substantive area of constitutional law, the Court clarifies
that the boundary of culpability in many instances is demarcated precisely
by the distinction between the effects that the government specifically
intends by its conduct and the incidental effects that flow from that
intended conduct, which in one way or another, may interfere with general
constitutional values such as freedom of religion, separation of church and
state, and freedom of speech.
a.  Free Exercise
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,229
the Court rejected a free exercise claim of two Native Americans
challenging an Oregon statute prohibiting use of the hallucinogen
peyote.230 The Court held that “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is
not the object . . . but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.”231 In support of the Court’s holding, it expressly cited
Washington v. Davis,232 connecting a constitutional “purposeful” intent
requirement under the Free Exercise Clause to the “discriminatory
purpose” intent requirement applied in Feeney under the Equal Protection
Clause.233
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234. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
235. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
236. The Smith Court’s holding was, and continues to be, highly controversial and provided
the impetus for Congress to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), Pub. L.
No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
Though the Supreme Court found in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997), that the
RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the States, there is still debate concerning its applicability
to federal statutes and regulations. See, e.g., Patrick K.A. Elkins, Comment, The Devil You Know!:
Should Prisoners Have the Right to Practice Satanism?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 613, 634 n.218 (2004)
(describing a split in the federal circuits regarding the continuing applicability of the RFRA to
federal law).
For further discussion of the notion of “prohibition” and the Supreme Court’s “intent”
requirement under the Free Exercise Clause, see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding
of the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 U. MO.-K.C. L. REV. 591, 597–98 (1991),
and Edward C. Lyons, Note, Oregon v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
Educational Perspective, 20 J.C. & U.L. 333, 340 n.31 (1994).
237. Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, concluded that Oregon’s interest in
enforcing its drug statutes was not only reasonable but constituted a “compelling interest”: “There
is also no dispute that Oregon has a significant interest in enforcing laws that control the possession
and use of controlled substances by its citizens. . . . [R]espondents do not seriously dispute that
Oregon has a compelling interest in prohibiting the possession of peyote by its citizens.” Smith, 494
U.S. at 904-05 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence illustrates that double effect analysis is equally applicable even
if claims are reviewed under strict scrutiny or any other constitutional standard. Requiring that the
governmental interest be compelling and narrowly tailored in view of the burden on citizens’
activities does not change the analysis under double effect, except by increasing the standard for
what sufficiently counts as a reasonably intended good to justify the unintended harm. Application
Though foreseen to interfere with a citizen’s exercise of religious
practice, Smith provides that as long as the intent or purpose of the law is
neutral with respect to religion—conceals no invidious purpose to hinder
the free exercise of religion—and is generally applicable, any detrimental
effect upon religious practice caused by it would not constitute grounds for
alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
According to the Court in Smith, the Free Exercise Clause’s language
that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of
religion]”234 forbids only acts purposely aimed at burdening religious
practice.235 On such an interpretation of the term “prohibit,” a generally
applicable, neutral law, whether it directly proscribes or compels action,
does not impermissibly “prohibit” free exercise. Though such a law may
foreseeably interfere with conduct that for some citizens constitutes acts
that have religious significance, this negative impact on free exercise is
viewed merely as an unintended incidental or fortuitous effect of the
neutral law.236
The presence of double effect analysis in Smith is obvious. Oregon’s
governmental purpose clearly was the effective enforcement of its drug
laws.237 Smith provides that as long as a legitimate purpose exists, and the
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of strict scrutiny would not alter the operation of double effect analysis because it still permits the
unintentional but foreseen negative effect on religious practices. As Justice O’Connor concedes:
To say that a person's right to free exercise has been burdened, of course, does
not mean that he has an absolute right to engage in the conduct. Under our
established First Amendment jurisprudence . . . the freedom to act, unlike the
freedom to believe, cannot be absolute. Instead, we have respected both the First
Amendment’s express textual mandate and the governmental interest in regulation
of conduct by requiring the government to justify any substantial burden on
religiously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
Id. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
238. Accord Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that denial of
a driver’s license based on religiously motivated refusal to provide a social security number did not
violate free exercise rights); Hines v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 148 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding tht a neutral prison grooming policy requiring all male inmates to keep their hair short and
remain clean-shaven did not violate the inmates’ right to free exercise of religion); Swanson ex rel.
Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 703 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
school district’s financially based, neutral regulation denying home-schooled children the right to
attend classes at a public school part-time did not violate the free exercise of rights of parent to
direct the student’s education); Intercommunity Ctr. for Justice and Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42, 43,
46 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Immigration Reform and Control Act requiring employers to
verify the residence and immigration status of employees did not violate the free exercise rights of
a religious organization whose beliefs compelled its adherents to provide employment to persons
in need without regard to residence, nationality, or immigrant status).
239. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
240. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
statute is neutral with respect to religion, the Constitution does not prohibit
foreseen but unintended effects that may incidentally burden religious
practices.238
b.  Establishment
Interpreting the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
providing that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion,”239 the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman240 developed its
well-known three-prong test for determining whether an Establishment
Clause violation has occurred:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration
of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. . . . First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
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241. Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
242. Members of the Court have, for example, suggested tests distinct from the Lemon test as
appropriate for evaluating Establishment Clause violations: “[W]hile there continues to be
indications of adherence to the Lemon Test, the Court has at least suggested the use of other tests
in analyzing Establishment Clause challenges.” Laura J. Bach, Note, For God or Grades? States
Imposing Fewer Requirements on Religious Home Schoolers and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 1337, 1365 (2004).
243. “The debate over the impermissible establishment of religion has historically been played
out, in large part, in the nation’s public schools. It is in this context that courts and legislatures have
attempted to determine when and if public funds can be used to aid private religious schools.”
Robert A. Dietzel, Comment, The Future of School Vouchers: A Reflection on Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris and an Examination of the Blaine Amendments as a Viable Challenge to Sectarian School
Aid Programs, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 791, 793 (2003).
244. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
245. Id. at 209, 219-22. The program, provided pursuant to Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941, channeled federal funds to the states
to provide remedial education and other secular assistance to enable qualifying students to meet
“[s]tate student performance standards.” Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10 (quoting § 6315(c)(1)(A)).
246. 20 U.S.C. § 6315(a), (b)(1)(B).
247. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 6312(c)(1)(F)).
248. Id. at 209-10 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 6320(a)(3)).
must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with
religion.”241
Although application of the Lemon test has a controversial history, and the
Court has struggled for consistency in its application over the years,242
more recent cases, at least those relating to governmental involvement in
aid to sectarian schools,243 hold that as long as the intent of a legislative act
is not to purposely aid religion, unintentional incidental benefits accruing
to a religion that result from such action can be permissible under the
Constitution.
In Agostini v. Felton,244 for example, the Court, applying the Lemon
test, considered the constitutionality of a federally funded program
providing on-site remedial instruction to disadvantaged children at private,
religiously affiliated institutions.245 Under the applicable federal statute,
any student qualified who resided in a low-income public school district
and who was at risk of failing the state’s performance standard.246 The
federal program required that program funds be made available “to all
eligible children, regardless of whether they attend public schools”247 and
that “services provided to children [at] private schools must be ‘equitable
in comparison to services and other benefits for public school children.’”248
Reviewing the statute under the Lemon test, the Court recognized,
without discussion, that the program in question clearly had a “‘secular
legislative purpose’” in seeking to provide remedial assistance with respect
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249. Id. at 218-19 (quoting Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83 (1985)).
250. Id. at 223.
251. Id. at 232-33. “Thus, it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and treat
it . . . as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.” Id. at 233.
252. Id. at 223. “As we have repeatedly recognized, government inculcation of religious
beliefs has the impermissible effect of advancing religion.” Id.
253. Id. at 234 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613-14 (1988); Witters v. Wash.
Dep’t of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986)). “New York City’s Title I program does
not run afoul of any of three primary criteria we currently use to evaluate whether government aid
has the effect of advancing religion: it does not result in governmental indoctrination; define its
recipients by reference to religion; or create an excessive entanglement.” Id.
254. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993)). In Zobrest, the parents of a deaf child attending a Catholic high school brought an action
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (2000),
seeking to require the school district to provide an on-premises interpreter for their child. Zobrest,
509 U.S. at 3. The Supreme Court held that provision of such an interpreter would not violate the
Establishment Clause: “When the government offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian
school as part of a general program that ‘is in no way skewed towards religion,’” it follows under
our prior decisions that provision of that service does not offend the Establishment Clause. Id. at
10 (citation omitted) (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 488).
255. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (quoting Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-83 (1973))). In Witters, a blind student
pursuing biblical studies at a Christian college appealed the denial, based on establishment grounds,
of financial aid from the Washington Commission for the Blind. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483-84. The
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not preclude the state from extending assistance
under a vocational rehabilitation assistance program to a blind person who chose to study at a
Christian college. Id. at 487-88. Summarizing the holding of Witters, the Court in Agostini held
to secular state educational performance standards.249 What remained at
issue, however, was whether the program had the impermissible principal
or primary “‘effect’ of advancing or inhibiting religion”250 and thus
triggered the “excessive entanglement” element of the Lemon test—an
element that the court noted often involved the same considerations.251
Discussing circumstances under which a violation of the Establishment
Clause might be found, the Court indicated that these elements centered
around the question of whether the governmental conduct had the effect of
“inculcati[ng] . . . religious belief[].”252 Based on two of its recent
Establishment Clause decisions, the Court found that no such effect or
entanglement existed and that the Title I program was constitutional.253
First, the Court noted that it had already rejected the view that the mere
physical presence of governmental employees on the grounds of private
religious institutions “inevitably results in the impermissible effect of
state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between
government and religion.”254 Further, the Court noted that when
governmental funds are “‘made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited,’” no impermissible effect of direct assistance occurs.255 Rather,
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that:
[W]e have departed from the rule . . . that all government aid that directly aids the
educational function of religious schools is invalid. In Witters we held that the
Establishment Clause did not bar a State from issuing a vocational tuition grant
to a blind person who wished to use the grant to attend a Christian college and
become a pastor, missionary, or youth director. Even though the grant recipient
clearly would use the money to obtain religious education, we observed that the
tuition grants were “‘made available generally without regard to the sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefited.’”
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225 (citation omitted) (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (quoting Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 782-83 n.38)).
256. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
257. See supra Part III.C.1.a.
258. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225-26. As seen in Zobrest and Witters, supra notes 254-55, if
such incidental benefits arise as incidental and unintentional effects of applying neutral federal
programs or regulations, they often can provide not inconsequential benefits to religious groups.
259. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
260. Id. at 369-70. The Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-471a,
as modified by 1965 amendments, created criminal liability for anyone who “knowingly destroys
[or] knowingly mutilates” the certificate. Id. § 462(b).
comparing such instances to a government employee donating his
paycheck to charity, aid to any private religious educational programs
under such conditions comes about “‘only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of’ individuals.”256
Parallel with the unintentional but foreseen burdens that may be
imposed upon free exercise of religion under Smith, the unintentional but
foreseen benefits that run to religion under Lemon, at least as applied in
cases such as Agostini and the cases upon which it relies, provide no basis
for a finding of unconstitutionality. Similar to the operation of double
effect analysis in the Free Exercise Clause context under Smith,257 the
Lemon test, at least in certain circumstances, recognizes no Establishment
Clause violation when a neutral, generally applicable statute or program
purposely aims at achieving a legitimate secular end—even though it may
have the unintended, incidental effect of benefiting religion in particular
circumstances.258
c.  Free Speech
In United States v. O’Brien,259 David Paul O’Brien alleged
constitutional infringement of his Free Speech rights based on his
indictment and conviction for burning his selective service registration
certificate (draft card).260 O’Brien argued that he had burned his card “to
influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs . . . and reevaluate their place
in the culture of today” and claimed that the prohibition against destruction
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261. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370.
262. Id. at 376.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 378-79.
265. Cf. Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that a regulation requiring employees to wear pants violated her First
Amendment right to wear a skirt as an expression of her cultural values and holding that the
nonspeech professional and safety purpose of the dress code justified any incidental burden on the
plaintiff’s rights); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s free speech challenge to a law forbidding distribution of computer
code capable of “circumventing . . . access control measures” and holding that “the anti-trafficking
provision of the DMCA had nothing to do with suppressing particular ideas of computer
programmers and everything to do with functionality—with preventing people from circumventing
technological access control measures,” similar to “laws prohibiting the possession of burglar tools
[which] have nothing to do with preventing people from expressing themselves by accumulating
what to them may be attractive assortments of implements and everything to do with preventing
burglaries”); Isaacs ex rel. Isaacs v. Bd. of Educ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 335, 338 (D. Md. 1999) (holding
of the card therefore was unconstitutional because it “was enacted to
abridge free speech, and because it served no legitimate legislative
purpose.”261
Rejecting O’Brien’s claim and affirming the conviction, the Supreme
Court found that even if the “communicative element” of O’Brien’s
conduct was “sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment,” it did not
“follow that the destruction of a registration certificate [was]
constitutionally protected.”262 Instead, distinguishing the regulation of
conduct that had both “nonspeech” and “speech” elements, the Court found
that “a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element [of conduct] can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms.”263
Disagreeing with O’Brien’s contention that the legislative prohibition
against mutilation or destruction of the certificates was intentionally or
purposely directed at curtailing the speech element, the Court found that
the regulation was imposed for a variety of substantial reasons unrelated
to the suppression of symbolic speech. These included proving registration
for the draft, determining immediate fitness, or lack thereof, for the draft
in a case of national emergency, facilitating communications between the
registrant and the proper local board, and reminding the registrant of the
continuing obligation to notify the local board of any change in address or
status.264
Similar to other First Amendment examples considered above, O’Brien
provides another instance where governmental conduct intentionally aimed
at certain important ends can permissibly have unintended but foreseen
consequences, incidentally restricting the free speech of citizens without
violating the First Amendment.265
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that a school’s “no hats” policy did not violate the First Amendment rights of a girl who wished to
wear an African headwrap to celebrate her African-American and Jamaican heritage because “[i]t
is . . . abundantly clear that the school’s interest in banning hats in the classroom to foster a good
learning environment is unrelated to the suppression of free expression”); Humanitarian Law
Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a law forbidding material
support to terrorist organizations did not infringe on the First Amendment rights of citizens who
wished to donate to these groups because the law’s “burden on Plaintiffs’ right to make political
contributions to the [terrorist groups] is not imposed because the government disfavors the political
speech promoted by the [terrorist groups], as distinguished from the political views of other groups
not subject to the statute,” but rather “Congress prohibits all material support to the [terrorist
groups], because pursuant to her delegated authority, the Secretary has determined that these
organizations engage in terrorist activity that threatens ‘the national defense, foreign relations, or
economic interests of the United States’”) (footnote call number omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189(d)(2) (1994)); In re C.P.K., 615 N.W.2d 832, 836 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s free speech claim based on punishment for burning crosses on school grounds in
violation of statute against “incendiary devices” and holding that “the statute here regulates
explosive or incendiary devices without regard to ideas expressed”); State v. Vaughn, 29 S.W.3d
33, 38-39 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that a motorcycle helmet law did not impinge on the
free speech rights of bikers who wished to express their respect for their dead comrade by riding
sans helmets because “the statute requiring helmets is content-neutral, as it has no relation to speech
or other forms of expressive conduct, nor does it seek to suppress expression as its purpose,” and
because “[t]he state interest of protecting the safety of motorcyclists on public roadways would
indeed be less effective without a regulation requiring the cyclists to wear protective headgear”).
266. In some instances, such as the content limitation on free speech in cases of “fighting
words,” intentional restrictions on some constitutional rights may be permitted under various
standards of justification such as a “compelling interest test” or other such tests. See, e.g.,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (affirming the constitutionality of an intentional
prohibition on speech that is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action”). In such instances, however, greater justification is demanded
than is required to justify unintentional, incidental effects like those subject to Smith.
In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993), for
example, the Supreme Court noted that some intentional governmental conduct is never
permissible. “[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible.” Id. (emphasis added).
On the other hand, sometimes the government may seek to intentionally prohibit particular religious
practices. See id. In such a case, however, “the law is not neutral and it is invalid unless it is
justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Although double effect most often is taken up in contexts where the intended harm is never
permissible because it is always ethically prohibited, as in the intentional killing of an innocent
person, sometimes such absolute harms are not at issue and a weaker application of double effect
is possible. In other words, while it may be permissible to intentionally cause some harmful effect,
d.  Synopsis
The First Amendment free exercise, establishment, and free speech
cases considered above all illustrate that, in certain circumstances,
unintended and incidental effects may be permitted under the Constitution
that would not be permissible under the same conditions if they were the
purposeful and intended goal of governmental action.266 In each case, while
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that intentional harming would require a greater justification than when harm was merely an
unintentional, foreseen side effect.
As one philosopher expresses this weaker application of double effect: “According to one of
the common readings of [double effect], the pursuit of a good tends to be less acceptable where a
resulting harm is intended as a means than where it is merely foreseen.” Warren S. Quinn, Actions,
Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, in THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE
EFFECT, supra note 32, at 23, 23 (emphasis added). In such a case, the principle of double effect
still holds true in asserting that under the same circumstances it would not be permissible
intentionally to cause a harm that may permissibly be caused as a foreseen, unintended side effect.
267. Consistent with the additional conditions under double effect, when the governmental
interest is not strong enough, even unintentional burdens on conduct will not be permissible. In a
free speech context, for example, even if the incidental burden on the speech aspect of conduct is
only incidental (i.e., unintended), that will sometimes not be justified because the governmental
purpose is not proportionate to the incidental burden. See, e.g., Bellecourt v. City of Cleveland, 789
N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the burning of an effigy of the Native
American sports mascot Chief Wahoo implicated free speech rights and that the city’s interest in
preventing the safety hazard was not sufficient to justify restricting burning the effigy on a paved
area barricaded from the public), rev’d in part on other grounds, 820 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 2004).
268. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides in relevant part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
demanding that the conduct be justified by a countervailing governmental
interest significant enough to justify those effects, the Court also
specifically required that such effects be unintentional and incidental.
Tracking the analysis under double effect, these cases provide further
instances in the law where the foreseen/intended distinction constitutes a
necessary condition justifying unintentional incidental restrictions on
conduct otherwise constitutionally protected.267
2.  Civil Rights Law
Similar considerations can be found in Fourteenth Amendment civil
rights cases, often involving issues concerning private employers’ alleged
violation of one or more federal statutes protecting employees from
adverse employment actions based on race, sex, age, etc.268 In general,
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42 U.S.C. § 2000E-2(a) (2000).
269. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
270. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
271. Id. at 802, cited in Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506.
272. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507.
273. Id. at 530 n.5 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
804).
allegations of such unlawful discrimination break down into two distinct
categories of claims: disparate treatment claims and disparate impact
claims.
a.  Disparate Treatment
In disparate treatment claims, the plaintiff-employee is required to
prove that the defendant-employer intentionally subjected him or her to
adverse employment action because of race, sex, age, nationality, etc, and
thus must prove express discriminatory intent or motive. In St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks,269 a case involving a disparate treatment claim
based on race, the Court cited to its early Title VII decision in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,270 holding that a plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence,
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants
from persons of complainant’s qualifications.271
As the Court clarified in Hicks, to avoid a compelling presumption of
discriminatory motive or intent, the burden of going forward then shifts to
the employer “to rebut the prima facie case—i.e., the burden of ‘producing
evidence’ that the adverse employment actions were taken ‘for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.’”272 Assuming that the employer is
able to provide such evidence, the plaintiff is then permitted to present
evidence that the employer’s “‘stated reason for . . . rejection was in fact
pretext.’”273 Under Hicks, the presumption created by the prima facie case
at that point drops out and the “trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate
question: whether plaintiff has proven ‘that the defendant intentionally
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274. Id. at 511 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
275. Id. at 505.
276. Id. at 504-05.
277. Id. at 506 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804).
278. Id. at 505.
279. Id. at 507, 525.
280. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., No. 88-109C(5), 1995 WL 879968, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Aug.
31, 1995), aff’d, 90 F.3d 285 (8th Cir. 1996).
281. Hicks, 90 F.3d at 286-87.
282. Id. at 291.
discriminated against [him]’ because of his race.”274
In Hicks, an African-American employee alleged that he had been
demoted and fired because of his race.275 Despite a promising start and
promotion as a correctional officer at a halfway house, the employee, after
coming under the authority of a new immediate supervisor, was subjected
to various disciplinary actions and eventually fired.276 The trial court held
that the employee had established a prima facie case of discrimination by
demonstrating that he was African-American, was qualified for the
position, was demoted and fired, and that the position was thereafter open
until filled by a Caucasian.277 The employer responded that it did not take
the adverse action against the employee because of his race, but rather
because of the employee’s violations of the company rules and the severity
and number of violations.278
The Supreme Court in Hicks ruled that this evidence was sufficient to
rebut the presumption created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case and
remanded for further proceedings.279 On remand, the district court held that
although the reasons given for firing the employee were pretextual because
the employers were in fact motivated by personal animosity unrelated to
the race of the employee.280 Hence, the employee was not fired because of
racial discrimination.
This judgment was, in turn, discussed and affirmed by the court of
appeals, which pointed out several salient facts supporting the conclusion
that the employee was not demoted and fired because of race.281 These
facts included a high percentage of African-Americans in the company’s
workforce, the review board that recommended disciplinary action was
nearly half composed of African-Americans, and half the supervisory
positions at the company were offered to African-Americans.282
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283. In reference to disparate impact, one commentator notes:
[D]isparate impact is actionable under only a subset of federal antidiscrimination
legislation. Examples go both ways: The Americans with Disabilities Act reaches
disparate impact, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (2000), but the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act may not, see Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (declining to decide whether disparate impact
theory is available under ADEA); id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
there are substantial reasons disparate impact analysis should not apply under the
ADEA). Title VI, which prohibits racial discrimination in any program receiving
federal funding, has no express disparate impact standard in its original text, and
unlike with Title VII, none has been read in by judicial construction. . . . As the
above discussion shows, the set of federal antidiscrimination statutes is too varied
to make it possible to say that Congress either does or does not hold an
antidiscrimination norm that reaches disparate impact.
Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975, 1027 n.187 (2004).
284. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
285. Id. at 432 (emphasis added). “[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” Id.
Note that the constitutional equal protection analysis based on claims of disparate impact
analysis differs from that under Title VII. Under the constitutional analysis, as seen above, specific
discriminatory intent must be found, although at times the evidence may permit it to be inferred
from a disparate impact. In Title VII, no such actual discriminatory intent need be found so long
as there is a disparate impact that is not justified by business necessity. The Supreme Court
ultimately rejected the Title VII disparate impact analysis with regard to constitutional equal
protection claims in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i) (2000).
b. Disparate Impact283
In disparate impact claims, unlike in disparate treatment claims, there
is no requirement that the plaintiff prove that the defendant-employer
intentionally subjected an employee to adverse action because of race,
religion, nationality, etc. Rather, the gravamen of the action is simply that
when an employer’s facially neutral employment policy is not justified by
a business necessity, any disparate effect upon a protected class or
employee caused by that policy is prohibited.284 As the Supreme Court
stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., developing and applying disparate
impact analysis to Title VII discrimination claims, “Congress directed the
thrust of the [Civil Rights] Act [of 1964] to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”285
Similar to the procedural burden-shifting regimen seen in disparate
treatment claims above, the Court in Griggs and its progeny, and Congress
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,286 provide that in order to present a prima
facie case a plaintiff must present specific evidence that an employer’s
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287. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-31.
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(a)(i); Title VII also explicitly prohibits employers from
claiming that intentional discrimination is justified by business necessity. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(2); see
also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52-53 (2003) (distinguishing between the burden-
shifting approaches in disparate treatment versus disparate impact cases).
289. A plaintiff may also prevail even if an employer shows a business necessity when there
is evidence that there is a non discriminatory “alternative employment practice and the respondent
refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), 2000e-
2(k)(1)(C).
290. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28.
291. Id. at 427.
292. Id. at 427-28.
293. Id. at 430 n.6.
294. Id. at 431.
295. Id. at 431-32.
296. Id. at 432, 436.
facially neutral employment practice has a disparate impact based on race,
color, religion, or another protected class.287 In defense, the employer may
offer proof that “the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity.”288 If the employer is able
to provide such evidence, no violation of civil rights will be found. If, on
the other hand, the employer is unable to show that the employment
practice in question is necessary for the carrying on of its business, it will
be found to have violated Title VII.289
In Griggs, an employee alleged that promotion policies within an
electric generating plant had an adverse effect upon African-Americans.290
Although the company had decided to permit African-American
employees to work outside of its Labor department, it adopted a policy
requiring a high school education to transfer out of Labor into a higher
paying department.291 Additionally, the company required all employees
placed outside of Labor to pass two aptitude tests.292 A study of
standardized testing, including the tests issued in this case, established that
only six percent of African-Americans passed the tests compared to fifty-
eight percent of Caucasians.293
The company responded that the education and testing requirements
were added to “improve the overall quality of the work force.”294 Evidence
presented at trial, however, established that workers who had been
admitted to non-Labor sectors before these requirements were imposed
performed satisfactorily despite their lack of high school education or a
passing score on aptitude tests.295 Although there was no assertion that the
company had a discriminatory intent, the court ruled that the policies of the
company had a unlawful disparate impact on African-American
employees.296
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297. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
299. The rationale for this distinction, though not obvious at first, finds its logic in a variety
of considerations. First, there are significantly different penalties imposed upon employers in each
case. Under amendments to federal law under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and
punitive damages are allowed for intention-based disparate treatment claims while the remedies
available for disparate impact claims are only reinstatement and back pay. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1)
(2000) (“In an action brought by a complaining party under . . . . the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .
against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment
practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) . . . the complaining party may recover
compensator and punitive damages . . . from the respondent.”); see id. § 2000e-5(g)(1).
In disparate treatment cases involving intentional discrimination and the potential for greater
punishment, the law logically sets up a higher burden for the plaintiff and an easier defense for the
employer. In disparate impact cases, however, where plaintiffs are not required to prove
discriminatory intent, and damages are allowed only for reinstatement and back pay, employers
have a heavier burden in defending their policies. Further, while cases often can be brought under
both theories on the same set of facts, disparate treatment cases often involve limited, acute adverse
employment actions taken against single individuals whereas disparate impact cases often involve
the application of company-wide discriminatory policies with potentially wider-ranging
discriminatory class-action effects.
c.  Synopsis
The operation of double effect analysis is present, although with
differences, in both disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses. In
either case, intentional purposeful discrimination against an employee on
the basis of one or more of the protected categories is always unlawful. At
the same time, however, under differing conditions, unintentional
incidental adverse employment action against members of protected
classes may be permitted.
The difference is found in the contrasting requirements an employer
must satisfy in order to justify that incidental detrimental effect. In
disparate treatment cases, so long as the employer offers a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason that is not a mere pretext, its actions will be
lawful.297 In disparate impact cases, however, the employer must offer a
justification that shows that the policy behind its discriminatory practices
is necessary for the carrying on of its business.298 Absent such a showing,
the employer’s policy, even if rationally related to its business pursuits,
will not be lawful.
Both types of cases reflect the basic premise of double effect that
unintentional, foreseen side effects are permissible if justified by a
sufficiently reasonable purpose. As the law provides, what constitutes a
sufficiently good purpose varies in disparate treatment and disparate
impact cases.299
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300. MENIKOFF, supra note 13, at 343; see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
D.  Conclusion
Contrary to strong statements asserted by opponents of double effect in
reaction to the Court’s express reliance on double effect in Quill, the
preceding considerations amply illustrate that no inherent inconsistency
exists between double effect analysis and legal conceptions of intent and
culpability. In fact, within circumscribed but not rare circumstances,
constitutional law recognizes, both for determining liability and imposing
punishment, that a relevant distinction exists between the intentional or
purposeful causing of effects and the causing of similar effects as merely
foreseen or incidental side effects of conduct. Of particular significance,
the Supreme Court’s rejection in multiple contexts of the propriety of
mandatory legal presumptions of intent based on the foreseeable and
probable effects of conduct explicitly disproves the claim that the law
requires a finding that actors “intend” the substantially certain
consequences of their conduct.
While it is true that double effect analysis does not carry over into all
areas of law, for example, in the law of intentional torts, no doubt exists
that in important areas of constitutional criminal law, First Amendment
jurisprudence, and federal civil rights, the distinction between specifically
intending certain effects and merely foreseeing effects plays a pivotal role
in liability determinations. Such an analysis belies any assertion that
double effect “has had little effect on legal analysis . . . . and it is far from
clear how useful it is in distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible actions.”300 Contrary to this contention, double effect, in fact
if not in name, has been shown to operate regularly at the most
fundamental level of culpability analysis in numerous areas of
constitutional law, providing a rational and apparently uncontroversial
basis for distinguishing conduct that is lawful from that which is not.
IV.  THE QUILL DECISION
Having established in Parts II and III, both philosophically and as
corroborated in case law, that a difference bearing significant ethical and
legal import exists between intending an effect and merely foreseeing that
effect as an unintended consequence of one’s conduct, it remains to
consider whether the Supreme Court’s analysis in Quill comports with
these insights.
Without reiterating the facts, procedural background, or case law relied
upon by the Supreme Court in Quill to support its double effect thesis, it
is clear that controversy over the opinion centers on the Court’s conclusion
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301. See supra notes 1-10, 24-29 and accompanying text.
302. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802 (1997) (quoting Assisted Suicide Hearing, supra note
26, at 367 (prepared statement of Leon R. Kass, M.D., Addie Clark Harding Professor, The College
and Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago)).
303. Id. at 807 n.11.
304. Id. at 794.
that physician-assisted suicide can be rationally distinguished from
accepted forms of medical treatment for the terminally ill solely on the
basis of the actors’ differing states of mind.301
In Quill, the Court found that physician-assisted suicide specifically
requires that participants “‘must, necessarily and indubitably, intend
primarily that the patient be made dead.’”302 In withholding life support
and palliative care, however, the Court found that the patient and physician
need not have any such intent, although they may indeed foresee that the
patient will die— the treatments “have the foreseen but unintended ‘double
effect’ of hastening the patient’s death.”303 Based on the Court’s finding
that as opposed to physician-assisted suicide, these latter forms of
treatment entail no purposeful intent to kill, the Court held that New York
law distinguishing them had a rational basis and did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.304
The determination, however, of whether the distinction made between
physician-assisted suicide and the other forms of conduct at issue in Quill
actually satisfies the conditions required by the principle of double effect
requires further consideration. In this context, it will be necessary and
beneficial to consider in some detail those arguments made in other lower
courts and Supreme Court decisions bearing directly on the issues raised
in Quill.
A.  Withholding of Life Support and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Rejecting plaintiffs’ constitutional equal protection claim, the district
court in Quill described the difference between physician-assisted suicide
and the withholding of life support in the following manner:
Plaintiffs . . . argue that . . . refusal of [life support]
treatment is essentially the same thing as committing suicide
with the advice of a physician. . . . To certain ways of
thinking, there may appear to be little difference between
refusing treatment in the case of a terminally ill person and
taking a dose of medication which leads to death. But to
another way of thinking there is a very great difference. In
any event, it is hardly unreasonable or irrational . . . to
recognize a difference between allowing nature to take its
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305. Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d sub nom. Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716 (1996), rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
306. Id.
307. See supra Part II.B.
308. 497 U.S. 261, 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
course, even in the most severe situations, and intentionally
using an artificial death-producing device.305
Thus, in the opinion of the district court, death in physician-assisted
suicide results directly from the biological effect on the patient’s body
caused by the lethal drug prescribed by the physician. In the case of
withdrawal of artificial life support such as a respirator or a kidney dialysis
machine, however, the court indicates that death is directly caused, not by
withdrawal of that support, but by “allowing nature to take its course,”306
that is, from the inability of the patient, arising out of an underlying
pathological state, to breathe or to purge blood of its toxins.
Reminiscent of the discussion of double effect in Aquinas,307 the
withholding of life support can be understood to have two foreseen effects:
one is the patient’s relief from the burden of treatment that promises no
substantial benefit and the other is the death of the patient. In such a case,
it is argued that double effect is satisfied because the intended good effect
is the relief from burdensome, futile treatment. Such relief, however, does
not come about by means of the death of the patient but by the removal of
the burdensome treatment itself. While such withholding may have the
foreseeable result of causing the death of the patient due to his or her
compromised physical state, death does not function, either physically or
in the intentional plan of the actors, as the means to the intended relief, but
is merely a concomitant effect of removing the burdensome medical
treatment.
Physician-assisted suicide, on the other hand, fails to track double
effect in any analogous manner. While the provision of a lethal dose of
drugs is arguably aimed at a permissible end—the patient’s relief from
suffering—it is not the case that the death of the patient caused by the
drugs functions either physically or in the mind of the actors as an
unintended concomitant side effect of some neutral means chosen to
relieve suffering. Rather, it is precisely the killing of the patient that is the
physician’s and patient’s goal in prescribing and accepting the lethal
dosage and that itself functions as the intended means to the relief from
suffering. As explained in Part II, however, double effect excludes
intentionally causing evil as a means to a good end.
The court of appeals in Quill, however, bolstered by statements of
Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,308 rejected the propriety of the district court’s
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310. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring).
311. Id. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring).
312. Id. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring).
313. Quill, 80 F.3d at 729.
314. Id. (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 296-97 (Scalia, J., concurring)) (alteration in original).
analysis of the distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the
withholding of life support.309 In Cruzan, Justice Scalia had denied
properly designating an act as “suicide” merely based on a distinction
between whether death resulted from a positive act or from mere “passive
acceptance of the natural process of dying.”310 Scalia pointed out that an
actor can commit suicide by omission as well as commission.311
Elaborating this point, he observed:
It would not make much sense to say that one may not kill
oneself by walking into the sea, but may sit on the beach until
submerged by the incoming tide; or that one may not
intentionally lock oneself into a cold storage locker, but may
refrain from coming indoors when the temperature drops
below freezing.312
Fastening on Scalia’s comments in Cruzan, the court of appeals in Quill
rebuffed the district court’s distinction between physician-assisted suicide
and the withdrawal of life support as positive killing versus merely
“allowing nature to take its course.”313 Instead, the court of appeals ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs on their equal protection claim, citing further
statements made by Scalia in Cruzan asserting that what properly
characterizes a “suicide” (either by omission or commission) is that “the
cause of death in both cases is the suicide’s conscious decision to ‘pu[t] an
end to his own existence.’”314 The court of appeals concluded without
argument or discussion that, in agreeing to withhold life support, a patient
makes an intentional decision to do precisely that, and it held that
withdrawal of life support was in fact a permissible form of suicide:
New York law does not treat equally all competent persons
who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten
their deaths . . . .
. . . .
. . . [T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are
on life-support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by
directing the removal of such systems; but those who are
similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-
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sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-
administering prescribed drugs. . . .
. . . The ending of life by these means is nothing more nor
less than assisted suicide.315
1.  Justice Scalia’s Concurrence in Cruzan
The court of appeals in Quill, however, seriously misconstrued Justice
Scalia’s point in Cruzan. It assumed that he was asserting that any decision
of a patient or physician to omit some action having the foreseeable effect
of causing death was a “suicide.” Justice Scalia’s point was much more
circumscribed.
In Scalia’s view, two considerations are relevant in determining
whether a patient may ethically refuse medical treatment. First, and most
importantly, such treatment is not proper if the omission is exercised with
the intended purpose of suicide. Second, assuming that the intended
purpose of the treatment is not the death of the patient, the good that is
intended by the omission must be justified in light of the foreseen effect of
the patient’s death.316
It is in respect to the first issue that Justice Scalia noted the primary
consideration for determining whether an act is suicide: “the suicide’s
conscious decision to ‘pu[t] an end to his own existence.’”317 In order to be
a suicide, the issue is not whether death results from a commission or an
omission, but whether the specific intent or purpose of the conduct was to
cause one’s own death. A person can intentionally commit suicide by
refusing to eat just as well as by intentionally shooting himself.318 Justice
Scalia sought to clarify that a death caused by an omission, such as a
“hunger strike,” does not escape characterization as suicide simply because
death comes about as a natural consequence of omitting to eat.
With respect to the second issue, Justice Scalia proposes that, even if
death is not intentional because the agent does not make a conscious
decision to end his or her life, these two conditions do not render the action
permissible.319 Rather, what must also be taken into account is whether the
decision to withhold treatment is reasonable in terms of the benefits and
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burdens offered to the patient by means of such conduct.
Traditionally, this distinction has been expressed as an ethical
obligation to undergo “ordinary” medical care to preserve one’s life but not
to undergo “excessive” or “heroic” measures.320 As Scalia explains:
I readily acknowledge that the distinction between action and
inaction has some bearing upon the . . . judgment of what
ought to be prevented as suicide—though . . . it would seem
to me unreasonable to draw the line precisely between action
and inaction, rather than between various forms of
inaction. . . . [T]he intelligent line does not fall between action
and inaction but between those forms of inaction that consist
of abstaining from ‘ordinary’ care and those that consist of
abstaining from ‘excessive’ or ‘heroic’ measures.321
Scalia’s analysis here closely tracks the proportionality prong of double
effect. When the rationale for withholding medical treatment is not to
intentionally cause death, and when death results from such “inaction,” it
is permissible only so long as that omission is reasonable in light of the
foreseen evil effect and the intended good.322
While the Quill court of appeals may appropriately cite Scalia’s
statement in Cruzan to call into question the correctness of the natural
processes rationale relied upon by the district court, its purported reliance
on his further comments to justify its conclusion that no distinction exists
between physician-assisted suicide and withdrawal of life support runs
roughshod over the very point Scalia was attempting to clarify. The court
failed to recognize Scalia’s emphasis on the intentional nature of suicide
and the normative conditions limiting when conduct unintentionally
causing foreseen death is permissible.
2.  McIntyre’s Third Constraint on Double Effect: Omissions
and Double Effect
In connection with this point, it is appropriate to consider one of the
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two constraints on double effect offered by McIntyre that was not
addressed in Part II.323 McIntyre notes that, in discussions of double effect,
illustrations are sometimes proffered suggesting that evil effects can be
justified under the doctrine precisely because such effects are caused by an
omission of the actor. McIntyre correctly notes that, in such scenarios, the
principle of double effect is in fact sometimes not in play at all. As stated
in Part II, her constraint (Constraint 3) provides:
DE [(double effect)] is not concerned with instances when a
foreseen effect is neither an intended end nor a chosen means
and “is one that an agent need not attend to, because it is not
his responsibility, or should not attend to, because the agent
has some reason to set it aside when deliberating . . . . DE
does not apply to explain the permissibility of bringing it
about.324
To make her point, McIntyre offers the example of a terrorist who
threatens to kill five people if the innocent moral protagonist does not
intentionally kill one innocent person.325 In such circumstances, McIntyre
points out that the ethical permissibility of the actor doing nothing—even
if that “omission” results in the terrorist shooting five innocent
people—does not require any appeal to double effect analysis.326 Rather,
under anything but the most strained and crass utilitarianism, no one would
hold the actor culpable for the death of the five. Culpability lies solely with
the terrorist and his moral agency. No authentic ethical reason exists for
imputing causal responsibility to the innocent actor for the harm to the five
innocents. As McIntyre states, “[t]he contrast between what you foresee as
a result of the agency of others and what you intend as a result of your own
agency is doing all of the explanatory work here.”327
Although the evil effect of the terrorist’s conduct is foreseen and not
intended, double effect has no explanatory role because there is no relevant
ethical sense in which the actor’s omission, under any plausible theory,
could be considered a candidate for responsibility in the first place, and
thus it does not need to be justified. In situations like the terrorist killings,
the actor need not offer any explanation under double effect for his
omission because in no significant moral sense is the actor responsible for
the effects caused by his “omission” of not killing the innocent party.
Connecting McIntyre’s denial of the applicability of double effect to
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such situations with the district court’s justification of withdrawal of life
support by reference to the “omission” of letting nature take its course
raises the question of whether a coherent basis exists for confirming the
propriety of the Quill decision without appealing to double effect. In other
words, does the omission argument work and not implicate double effect?
A legal discussion relevant to this point is the distinction between a
person’s duties with respect to omissions and a person’s duties with respect
to commissions. In many, if not most, circumstances, harm that befalls
others or that is inflicted by third parties is generally not imputable to an
actor, say a passerby, simply because he or she could have done something
to prevent the harm but did not. Where no legal duty exists, no obligation
to act exists, and therefore, no justification need be produced for allowing
the harm to occur. This legal example illustrates McIntyre’s point in
Constraint 3.328 If there is no duty to act, an omission cannot be the basis
for culpability that requires justification.
Sometimes under ethics and the law, however, affirmative duties do
exist to prevent harm or render aid to third parties. As Scalia notes in
Cruzan, the duties of a parent to a child or of a physician to a patient
starkly illustrate instances where omissions standing alone cannot validate
denials of culpability.329 Rather, when a general affirmative duty to prevent
some harm to another exists, arguments must be introduced to justify an
actor’s failure to so do so.330 These cases do not fit into McIntyre’s model
in Constraint 3 because, in such cases, the actor cannot exculpate himself
merely by pointing to his or her omission.
Applying this analysis to physicians and terminally ill patients, it is
clear that the relationship is not generally one where the physician, like the
bystander or actor vis-à-vis the terrorist, can exculpate himself merely by
pointing to the fact that his conduct was that of omission. In such a
context, as the Quill court of appeals correctly points out, a
commission/omission distinction standing alone cannot, in McIntyre’s
words, “do[] all of the explanatory work.”331 Rather, as Scalia’s comments
correctly indicate, determining whether a duty exists to continue life
support requires application of double effect. It first must be determined
whether there is an intent to cause death, and assuming no such intention
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exists, further evaluation must be made regarding whether the intended
benefit the treatment offers is justified in spite of the harm it will
unintentionally effect upon the terminally ill patient.
In other words, Constraint 3 does not dispense with the necessity of
double effect analysis in cases involving the withdrawal of life support
simply because death may be a natural consequence. While the fact that an
“evil” effect results from an omission rather than a commission may
sometimes provide evidence that an effect was not intentional, that fact
standing alone will not always absolve an actor of responsibility. Although
the court of appeals’ decision misconstrued the import of Scalia’s position
in Cruzan, it was correct in pointing out that the district court’s attempt to
ethically distinguish physician-assisted suicide from withholding of life
support solely on the basis of the fact that death results from a natural
process does not end the moral inquiry.332
B.  Palliative Care and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Corroborating this critique of the district court’s reasoning in Quill, the
Ninth Circuit en banc decision in Compassion in Dying v. Washington333
notes that the approach taken by the district court in Quill could never
logically justify a distinction between palliative care and physician-assisted
suicide. In palliative care, no argument can be made that the death of the
patient results merely from letting nature take its course. As Judge
Reinhardt describes it:
[Palliative care] commonly takes the form of putting a patient
on an intravenous morphine drip, with full knowledge that,
while such treatment will alleviate his pain, it will also
indubitably hasten his death. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that the actual cause of the patient’s death is the
drug administered by the physician . . . . 334
In fact, the prior discussion’s rejection of the view that an omission
standing alone can be the primary factor ethically distinguishing
withholding of life support from physician-assisted suicide is important
precisely because it clarifies that double effect does not depend upon the
evil effect resulting from an omission. Rather, all that is required is that the
evil effect not be intended and not function as a means to the intended
good effect. In connection with Reinhardt’s point concerning the active
causation of death in palliative care, McIntyre properly observes that
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sometimes double effect is expressed incorrectly in language implying that
evil effects are merely “permitted” or “allowed” rather than actually being
caused by the actor’s conduct:
Proponents of DE should emphasize that it is a
misinterpretation of the principle to think of it as classifying
unintended harms that are the direct causal consequence of an
agent’s action as something which the agent didn’t really do,
or isn’t really responsible for, as if the status of being “merely
foreseen” caused the gravity of a harm to be massively
discounted or the person’s agency to be changed from causing
to allowing.335
This, in fact, is the problem with understanding the operation of double
effect to be properly captured by the “allowing nature to take its course”
argument.336 If unintended evil effects were permissible only when
resulting from the natural consequences of an actor’s omission, palliative
care could never be justified. In such treatment, there is no question that
administration of opioids is a substantial factor causing the patient’s death.
Similarly, a strategic bomber’s acts may often just as directly cause the
death of innocent civilians as they destroy the military installation, and acts
of self-defense involving lethal force may just as directly cause the death
of an assailant as his or her fending off. Any demand that the physical,
causal relation between an actor’s conduct and its harmful effect
suggesting that the harm is simply “allowed” or “permitted” would be
misleading and justify criticism of double effect as fanciful. Proper
characterization of double effect must concede that often the foreseen
harms, though unintended, do in a foreseeable, physical, causal sense often
directly result from the actor’s conduct.
Having conceded this point, however, it remains to determine whether
double effect can adequately distinguish palliative care from physician-
assisted suicide. In this context, it is appropriate to consider the fourth and
final constraint offered by McIntyre.337 In Constraint 4, McIntyre clarifies
that double effect is not appropriately applied if the specific conduct
chosen as a means to the good effect cannot be distinguished from the evil
effect itself.338 In order to apply double effect then, there must be some
reasoned basis for distinguishing “what an agent intends as a means and as
an end from what is merely foreseen” that does not prejudge
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permissibility.339 When engaging in conduct subject to analysis under
double effect, the actor must have a sufficiently clear and legitimate basis
for distinguishing what constitutes the “means to the good effect” from
“the evil effect” itself. Only such a distinction prevents the actor from
violating the proscription against causing evil as a means to a good end. In
philosophical circles, this difficulty is referred to as the problem of
“closeness.”340
A contemporary example suggesting the problem of closeness has been
presented by the recent case of the Maltese conjoined twins, Jodie and
Mary.341 The girls’ parents had traveled to Britain to receive better medical
care after they learned that their daughters would be born conjoined.342 The
girls were joined together at the pelvis, and each had her own set of arms
and legs.343 In their common area, they shared an aorta, bladder, torso, and
partial spinal column.344 There was a single heart and pair of lungs in
Jodie’s chest cavity.345 Mary survived from blood and oxygen circulated
by Jodie’s heart and lungs.346
Doctors predicted that both girls would die within months after birth
due to their inability to circulate enough blood and oxygen from the heart
and lungs in Jodie’s body.347 They also believed that if the twins were
separated, Jodie had a good chance of survival, although Mary would
certainly die.348 Doctors expected to begin the separation process by
determining the structure of the twins’ anatomy.349 They first would
separate the pelvic bones, and then the spines.350 The physicians
understood, however, that once they clamped off that portion of the single
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aorta extending into Mary’s body from Jodie’s, Mary would die from lack
of oxygenated blood.351
In this case, the closeness problem arguably surfaces in view of the
following question: Does this separation procedure count as a case of
morally indifferent conduct by returning each twin’s body to its “naturally
defective state” with the intended good result of saving Jodie and the
unintended but foreseen evil result of Mary’s death, or does the separation
procedure, involving the purposeful clamping and severing of the aorta
from Jodie to Mary, itself merely constitute an intentional killing or
mutilation of Mary?352 While resolution of the closeness problem in this
case is beyond the scope of this Article, it illustrates the difficulty
encountered in some double effect cases that even proponents might
reasonably disagree about and to which McIntyre’s Constraint 4 is
directed.
Judge Reinhardt’s analysis of palliative care suggests that he believes
palliative therapy represents a case very similar to the “closeness” problem
just described:
[W]e excuse the act or, to put it more accurately, we find the
act acceptable, not because the doctors sugarcoat the facts in
order to permit society to say that they couldn’t really know
the consequences of their action, but because the act is
medically and ethically appropriate even though the
result—the patient’s death—is both foreseeable and
intended.353
The claim is that the very act of relieving pain by administration of
opioids is precisely the intentional killing of the patient. In such case, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that no meaningful distinction exists between
palliative care and physician-assisted suicide, and thus double effect
cannot be applied to justify the one and condemn the other. Reinhardt
asserts that any attempt to distinguish palliative care from physician-
assisted suicide is a distinction without a difference:
[W]e see little, if any, difference for constitutional or ethical
purposes between providing medication with a double effect
and providing medication with a single effect, as long as one
of the known effects in each case is to hasten the end of the
patient’s life. . . . To us, what matters most is that the death of
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the patient is the intended result as surely in one case as in the
other. . . . To the extent that a difference exists, we conclude
that it is one of degree and not of kind.354
In response, proponents of double effect can concede that in palliative
care the conduct engaged in is similar to physician-assisted suicide to the
extent that, in some circumstances, the quantity of opioid necessary to
relieve a patient’s pain may indeed constitute a lethal dose. As explained
in Part II, however, application of double effect often involves the contrast
of two acts that from a physical perspective may be very similar or even
identical in their effects.355 What is crucial for successfully distinguishing
between the two acts is the ability to clearly show that in one of the cases
the evil effect can be distinguished from what is intended as a means and
end in the other.
Upon close examination, acts of palliative care clearly can be
distinguished from physician-assisted suicide on this basis. Administration
of opioids in palliative care neither logically nor in practice demands its
identification with intentional killing. Provision of opioids is the standard
medical treatment for traumatic pain, and in the vast majority of cases,
including cases of terminally ill patients, death is a rare and an unusual
outcome.356 In a terminally ill patient, adequate pain relief and/or sedation
usually results before serious depression of respiration and death.357 More
particularly, the psychological effect of pain relief, mediated by the
stimulation of opioid receptors in the brain, is clearly distinguished from
the distinct physiologic effect of respiratory depression also mediated by
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On these facts, it becomes obvious that the physical cause of pain relief
intended in palliative care is itself not mediated or “instrumentally” caused
by the concomitant effect of respiratory depression. Thus, the
psychological effect of pain relief mediated directly by stimulation of
opioid receptors can be clearly and unproblematically distinguished from
the distinct effect of respiratory depression that in some rare instances
foreseeably causes death. Here, any closeness problem is avoided because
the means intended to achieve the effect of pain relief—administration of
opioid and stimulation of opioid receptors—does not entail intending the
other concomitant effect—respiratory depression.
In physician-assisted suicide, however, the intent of the actor with
respect to means and ends is significantly different. The intent in providing
a lethal opioid dosage is precisely to stimulate the opioid receptors in order
to cause respiratory depression, and by that means, to intentionally cause
death. While such conduct may be directed toward a morally acceptable
ulterior end of the patient’s relief from suffering, it is achieved in
physician-assisted suicide precisely by the intentionally chosen means of
killing the patient by respiratory depression.
Despite this clear and arguably unproblematic distinction between the
two states of mind found in physician-assisted suicide and palliative
care—made possible by the distinct physical effects that result from opioid
administration—some opponents of double effect, such as Judge Reinhardt
in his Ninth Circuit opinion, continue to insist that no legitimate distinction
can be found.359
Given the support for the distinction, however, in both professional
medical practice and in the law’s recognition that in many contexts
purposeful acts can be distinguished from acts carried out with mere
knowledge, Judge Reinhardt’s response is simply inadequate. Its failure
seriously to engage the legal, medical, and ethical arguments supporting
a distinction between these practices and the highly subjective nature of
that rejection emphasizing what it “sees” and what “matters most” to it
suggests that such a facile dismissal cannot count as a serious piece of
legal or rational analysis.360
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arguments distinguishing physician-assisted suicide from palliative care is reflected in the
dismissive treatment given to the American Medical Association’s amicus brief’s effort to
distinguish physician-assisted suicide and palliative care:
The American Medical Association . . . argu[es] that doctors who give medication
with knowledge that it will have a double effect, including hastening death, should
not be deemed to have violated Washington’s assisted suicide law. The
organization struggles mightily, albeit unsuccessfully, to distinguish for legal
purposes between the administration of medication for a dual and a single
effect. . . . The line the AMA seeks to draw conflicts with reason as well as with
the proper constitutional approach.
Id. at 828 n.102 (emphasis added).
It might seem odd that, despite devoting so much effort attempting to establish that no
distinction exists between physician-assisted suicide and the other medical practices, the court of
appeals refused to rule on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims in Compassion in Dying, but
instead ruled for the plaintiffs only on their due process claims. See id. at 798. The strategy of the
court of appeals, however, appears clear. Without wishing expressly to so state, the en banc
opinion’s due process ruling hinges entirely on the equal protection issue. Only by identifying
physician-assisted suicide with other accepted medical practices—practices that citizens arguably
have a constitutional liberty right to under Cruzan—can the court of appeals find a justification for
the due process right to physician-assisted suicide. By refusing to rule directly on the equal
protection claim, however, the court of appeals arguably sought to avoid the possibility of direct
scrutiny of that purported identification under an equal protection analysis.
361. See supra Part IV.A.1.
362. See supra Part IV.A.2.
363. See supra Part II.D.
364. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
In light of the preceding considerations of the lower court decisions in
Quill and Glucksberg,361 it becomes clear that a distinction between
physician-assisted suicide and the accepted medical treatments satisfying
double effect analysis requires a specific set of conditions that none of the
lower court decisions adequately capture. Particularly helpful in this regard
are insights suggested by Scalia’s concurrence in Cruzan362 and McIntyre’s
analysis of various constraints upon double effect.363 These discussions
reveal four conditions necessary for distinguishing between the practices
in a way that satisfies the demands of double effect.
First and foremost is the distinction between actual intent and
knowledge. As Scalia points out in Cruzan, the most significant element
defining suicide and distinguishing it from other types of acts that cause
death is a state of mind constituting a conscious decision to put an end to
one’s life.364 Following closely upon this point, any proper account of a
distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the other acts cannot
solely be based on a commission/omission basis. Rather, the essential
question is whether, in the context of a physician’s duty of beneficence to
the terminally ill patient, the conduct in question can be justified by an
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to bring about in order to reach that goal (sending troops into battle) does not logically require that
Allied soldiers die. Although General Eisenhower may know as a matter of fact that some of his
men will be required to make the ultimate sacrifice, he does not need the deaths to make his
intended end come about.
Contrast this example, however, with the United States’s bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August of 1945. NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE AMERICAN CENTURY: VARIETIES OF CULTURE IN
MODERN TIMES 406-07 (1997). In those cases, President Truman, in conjunction with United States
military advisors, decided that, in order to end the war in the Pacific Theatre quickly and with less
loss of American lives, the atomic bomb should be used against Japanese civilian populations. Id.
In that case, closely paralleling the case of the unethical terror bomber, the death of civilian
noncombatants was precisely the means chosen to accomplish the end sought—demoralizing the
Japanese nation’s will to fight on.
[T]he reason for selecting Hiroshima for atomic attack was not that its modest
intended good that reasonably accounts for why it makes sense to
cause—either by omission or commission—that grave, albeit unintended,
harm. Finally, as disclosed by consideration of McIntyre’s “closeness”
problem and Judge Reinhardt’s majority en banc opinion in Glucksberg,
the account must show how neither accepted medical practice constitutes
the intentional killing of the patient as an acceptable means to the intended
end of relief from suffering.
C.  Quill’s Resolution
The Supreme Court’s decision in Quill rejecting the plaintiffs’ equal
protection claim corroborates all these requirements for application of
double effect.
1.  Intention and Forseeability
As explained at length in Part III, the Supreme Court, citing Bailey,
Morissette, and Feeney and explicitly referring to the principle of “double
effect,” proposed that a distinction between physician-assisted suicide and
the accepted medical practices exists based on a difference between actual
intent and mere foreknowledge of the death of the patient.
As the Court explained, the law has drawn a distinction in specific areas
between conduct engaged in “because of” a particular effect—with the
purpose of bringing that effect about—and conduct that is carried out “in
spite of” that effect—with the mere knowledge that an act done for other
purposes will have such an effect.365 Applying this distinction to the facts
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military installation challenged the US or its forces . . . . It was rather that
Hiroshima met the requirement that some Japanese city be destroyed, without
warning, by an attack designed to maximize the shock of destruction of people
and structures, and so overcome Japanese willingness to continue the war.
JOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM 93 (l987).
366. Quill, 521 U.S. at 802 (quoting Assisted Suicide Hearing, supra note 26, at 367 (prepared
statement of Leon R. Kass, M.D., Addie Clark Harding Professor, The College and Committee on
Social Thought, University of Chicago)); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
367. Id. (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985)).
368. Id. at 807 n.11.
369. Id. at 801 (citing People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (Mich. 1994)); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d at 1226 (stating that when a feeding tube is removed, death “result[s] . . . from [the
patient’s] underlying medical condition”); In re Colyer, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (Wash. 1983) (“[D]eath
which occurs after the removal of life sustaining systems is from natural causes . . . .”); Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Am. Med. Ass’n, Report of the Council on Ethical and Judical
Affairs of the American Medical Association, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 91, 93 (1994) (“When a life-
sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies primarily because of an underlying disease”).
of the case before it, the Court observed that in physician-assisted suicide,
a physician “‘must, necessarily and indubitably, intend primarily that the
patient be made dead.’”366 Acts involved in carrying out the accepted
treatments, however, do not entail such an intent: “[P]atients who refuse
life-sustaining treatment ‘may not harbor a specific intent to die’ and may
instead ‘ferverently wish to live’”367 and “[j]ust as a State may . . . permit[]
patients to refuse unwanted lifesaving treatment, it may permit palliative
care related to that refusal, which may have the foreseen but unintended
‘double effect’ of hastening the patient’s death.”368
2.  Commission/Omission
Although the character of an omission can present an important fact
bearing on the determination of whether an agent actually intends a
harmful effect, it is clear in Quill that the Court did not consider the
commission/omission distinction as a primary factor for determining
whether a medical treatment that is foreseen to causally contribute to the
death of the patient is permissible.
The Court, like the district court, noted that the immediate cause of
death in some instances represents an important factual distinction between
the withdrawal of life support and physician-assisted suicide: “[W]hen a
patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal
medication prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication.”369
In Quill, dealing only with medical practices relating to the terminally
ill, the term artificial life support logically corresponds to practices, as
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370. Iowa, for example, defines “[l]ife-sustaining procedure” to encompass “any medical
procedure, treatment, or intervention . . . which meets both of the following requirements: a.
Utilizes mechanical or artificial means to sustain, restore, or supplant a spontaneous vital function.
b. When applied to a patient in a terminal condition, would serve only to prolong the dying
process.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.2(8) (West 2005). In conjunction with this, Iowa defines
“terminal condition” to mean
an incurable or irreversible condition that, without the administration of life-
sustaining procedures, will, in the opinion of the attending physician, result in
death within a relatively short period of time or a state of permanent
unconsciousness from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, there
can be no recovery.
Id. § 144A.2 (13). Many states adopt similar definitions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(8) (2004);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-18-103(7) (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(6) (2002); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 35/2-(d) (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-1 (West 2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.58.2(9) (West 2004); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.010(3) (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2133.01(Q) (West 2004); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5403 (West 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 70.122.020(5) (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5) (West 2003).
In view of the limitation of Quill to claims concerning medical treatment of terminally ill
patients, whether the holding also supports the legal permissibility of the withdrawal of hydration
and nutrition in cases of persistent vegetative state (PVS) patients who are not dying or terminally
ill is not at issue and thus not addressed by this Article. The question of whether withdrawal of
hydration and nutrition in such patients where the actual immediate cause of death would be
starvation is more problematic and raises issues of closeness and proportionality. See supra note
340 and accompanying text. For an ethical consideration rejecting the permissibility of such
practices, see PONTIFICAL ACAD. FOR LIFE & WORLD FED’N OF CATHOLIC MED. ASS’NS, LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENTS AND VEGETATIVE STATE: SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES AND ETHICAL
DILEMMAS (2004), available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/
documents/rc_pont-acd_life_doc_20040320_joint-statement-veget-state_en.html.
371. Quill, 521 U.S. at 801-02.
defined by many states, that prolong the “dying process.”370 Hence, in
Quill, it is not illegitimate for the Court to emphasize that the immediate
cause of death at issue would indeed not be the withdrawal itself, but the
underlying dysfunctional physical state of the patient.
In its discussion of palliative care and its differentiation from
physician-assisted suicide, however, the Court did not rely on any similar
factual distinction between commission and omission. In the case of
physician-assisted suicide, it is clear that the lethal dose of drugs, and not
simply the underlying pathological condition, causes death. Although it
may be true that death in palliative care rarely occurs under the proper
administration of pain relief, sometimes the cause of death, as in physician-
assisted suicide, will be administration of the drug and its effect upon the
body of the patient.
In such instances, the Court acknowledged that it is only the intent of
the actor that can properly distinguish palliative care from physician-
assisted suicide.371 As argued above, the legitimacy of this distinction is
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372. Id. at 801-02, 807 n.11.
373. Id. at 801 (quoting Assisted Suicide Hearing, supra note 26, at 368 (prepared statement
of Leon R. Kass, M.D., Addie Clark Harding Professor, The College and Committee on Social
Thought, University of Chicago)).
374. Id. at 802 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1224).
375. Id.
found in the fact that pain relief occurs in a physical manner that does not
involve intending the death of the person as a means to that effect, even if
it is the case that death flows just as immediately as an effect from the
intended means as does the good effect.
Based on these considerations, it is evident that in withholding life
support or administering palliative care in terminally ill patients, the intent
of the actors (both physician and patient) is not necessarily associated with
an intention that the patient die.
3.  Reasonability of Choice
Turning to the proportionate reason analysis under double effect, it
appears generally that withdrawal of life support and palliative care can be
ethically justified only under circumstances in which the patient is
terminally ill. For only in those circumstances would the benefit of
continued treatment be so small as to justify the foreseen evil effect of the
death of the patient. In the context of differentiating physician-assisted
suicide from the accepted medical practices, the Court indicated that the
permissibility of the withholding of life support and palliative care requires
a balancing of the intended good in view of the harm foreseen.372
Applying this “proportionate reason” element of double effect, the
Court noted that withholding life support is permissible because it has as
its end “to cease doing useless and futile or degrading things to the patient
when [the patient] no longer stands to benefit from them.”373 The Court
further noted that the patient may “‘fervently wish to live, but to do so free
of unwanted medical technology, surgery, or drugs.’”374 In these
comments, the Court recognized that the good of the patient to be
physiologically and psychologically free from invasive and burdensome
medical treatment is justified only in light of the patient’s dire condition.
The conduct deprives the patient of no significant benefit by
unintentionally curtailing a life that would otherwise extend for only a
short while.
Similarly, in the case of palliative care, the Court noted: “The same is
true when a doctor provides aggressive palliative care; in some cases,
painkilling drugs may hasten a patient’s death, but the physician’s purpose
and intent is, or may be, only to ease his patient's pain.”375 In such a case,
the Court recognized that even though the provision of pain relief may on
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376. See supra notes 26, 301, 366 and accompanying text.
occasion foreseeably cause death by respiratory depression, such pain
relief justifies, in light of the objectively dire state of the patient’s
terminally ill status, any minimal decrease in life span.
In Quill, then, the distinction drawn between physician-assisted suicide
and the accepted forms of medical treatment satisfies the reasonability
element of double effect and, in so doing, provides a sufficiently rational
basis for rejecting the plaintiffs’ constitutional equal protection claims.
4.  No Instrumental Intention of Harm
The preceding points illustrate, without need of further elaboration, that
the Court recognized that in both withholding of life support and palliative
care a physician may foresee to a moral certainty that a patient will, or very
likely may, die as a consequence of the treatment, but that the patient’s
death is itself not part of the actor’s intent. While death may result either
from withholding of life support or from palliative care, neither case
entails a physician or patient intending to relieve the burden or pain by
means of death. Both psychologically and physically, the conduct chosen
involves nothing that constitutes the intentional killing of the patient, but
rather is conduct with both a good and a harmful effect. In each case, the
good effects result from causal means that do not involve the operation of
the evil effect as a means.
While, from a sympathetic point of view, physician-assisted suicide
may be considered to have a legitimate ulterior end—relief of pain and the
burden of extended terminal illness—the specific intent in physician-
assisted suicide differs from these treatments precisely because the actor’s
intention is that the patient “be made dead” in order to achieve those
ulterior ends.376
V.  CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to elaborate in detail the ethical and
philosophical justification for the Supreme Court’s explicit reliance on the
doctrine of double effect as well as to confirm legal precedent for that
reliance in American case law’s tacit endorsement of the principle in
multiple areas of substantive constitutional law.
In the treatment of intentional action, a distinction is drawn in ethics
and legal considerations, in circumscribed but important areas, between an
actor’s “specific intent” or purpose and the effects of conduct that are
merely foreseen. If the intended good is significant enough or the harm
considered not important enough to justify interfering with the actor’s
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378. Id. at 808.
pursuit of those intended goods, the action will be permitted even though
it is foreseen to have a harmful result.
Applying such reasoning in Quill, the Supreme Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that New York state law distinguishing withholding
of life support and palliative care from physician-assisted suicide was
“irrational” or “arbitrary.”377 The Supreme Court concluded that “[l]ogic
and contemporary practice support New York’s judgment that the . . . acts
are different, and New York may therefore, consistent with the
Constitution, treat them differently.”378 Though not all may agree with the
Court’s decision, its reliance on the principle of double effect conforms to
widely, if not universally, accepted ethical and medical norms and has a
secure foundation in American law.
Although double effect has several conditions that make its utilization
in some cases difficult, and in others inappropriate, this does not render the
doctrine otiose. Operation of some form of the principle, by whatever
name, is inevitable. In an imperfect world where duties and interests often
collide, the possibility of choices of action foreseen to have both good and
harmful consequences cannot be avoided. In rare circumstances, ethics and
the law require that a person refrain from acting altogether. More often,
however, they provide that a determination of whether an actor may pursue
the good effect, although knowing it will or may unintentionally cause a
harmful effect, requires a more complex analysis—a double effect
analysis.
